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I. INTRODUCTION
As society enters a new millennium, the age-old problem of determining
paternity is finally being eradicated. Science has provided the solution to this
problem through the precision of DNA profiling. 4 Accordingly, courts are
beginning to accept and apply DNA profiling by holding this evidence
admissible.5 Courts may now order the child, the biological mother and the
putative father, as well as other relevant parties such as the child's siblings or
grandparents, to submit to both traditional and DNA paternity tests.6 By
extracting a small quantity of blood or tissue from the child, the mother and
the putative father under highly controlled testing conditions and then
subjecting the sample to DNA profiling, it is now possible to scientifically
determine the probability of paternity almost to a near certainty which should
more than fulfill both substantive and procedural legal requirements. 7
The significance of this new paternity test is two-fold. First, all future
contested paternity actions would be categorically transformed if the test
results, when above a certain percentage indicating paternity, are accorded
conclusive evidential weight of paternity. This would create a presumption of
4 DNA profiling is also known as DNAfingerprinting (patented term used byCellmark
Diagnostics, a biochemical laboratory), DNA typing (see William C. Thompson & Simon
Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L.
REV. 45 (1989)) and DNA print identification (patented term by Lifecodes Corporation, a
biochemical laboratory). See Jessie Jo Barr, Note, The Use of DNA Typing in Criminal
Prosecutions: A Flawless Partnership of Law and Science, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 485 n.5
(1989). This Article will use the term "DNA profiling" because it is the term used by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 487 n.8.
5See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 & 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989), Cobey v. Maryland, 559
A.2d 391 (Md. App. Ct. 1989), In re Adoption of Baby Girl S, 532 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Surr. Ct.
1988). Cf. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (DNA profiling theory
accepted but procedure used to achieve results rejected). See infra note 195.
61t is well settled law that a court may constitutionally order blood tests. See State
v. Damm, 266 N.W. 667 (S.D. 1936) (trial court has inherent power to order parties to
submit to blood tests in order to ascertain the truth). See also In re Rogers, 583 A.2d 782,
784 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980);
Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1969); Anthony v. Anthony, 74 A.2d 919 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1950). By extension, there is no reason to doubt the constitutionality of a
court-ordered blood or tissue test for DNA profiling, as long as it is not invasive. See
WILLIAM J. CURRAN & E. DONALD SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINEANDFORENSIC SCIENCE 154-55
(3d ed. 1982).
7The probability of paternity is a mathematical concept based on the frequency of
specific gene variations-called alleles--occurring in the general population which
determines the likelihood whether the accused man is the biological father. See generally
DANIEL L. HARTL, A PRIMER ON POPULATION GENETICs (1981). See also infra text at 24-29.
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substantive law shifting the burden of production and persuasion from the one
bringing the action to the other party.8 Whereas traditional paternity testing
only conclusively excluded a putative father, 9 this new test can statistically
exclude the rest of the world's male population by a probability formula. 10
Thus, the putative father can now be conclusively included into the set of
possible fathers which is infinitesimally small.1 1 Accordingly, the likelihood
8This is a classic Morgan presumption that shifts both the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion to the other party. It is also possible that a Thayer-Wigmore
"bursting bubble" presumption be applied whereby the presumption of paternity
created by a positive DNA paternity test could simply be rebutted by the other party
meeting their burden of production and without the burden of persuasion ever shifting.
See CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
947-80 (3d ed. 1984).
9Traditionally, forensic blood group testing was used to exclude suspects, as when
fingerprints do not match. However, unlike fingerprints, the test could not be used to
establish a match because blood groupings are simply too large. See infra text at 25-27.
See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 7 (1981) ("Since millions of men belong to thepossible
groups and types, a blood grouping test cannot conclusively establish paternity.
However it can demonstrate nonpatemity ....").
1OUnder the Hardy-Weinberg principal, population gene frequencies and
population genotype frequencies remain constant from generation to generation if
mating is random and if mutation, selection, immigration and emigration do not occur.
The study of population genetics uses mathematical models utilizing the
Hardy-Weinberg principal in order to study the relationship between the allele and
genotype frequencies. GEORGE J. BREWER & CHARLES F. SING, GENErICS 588-642 (1983).
The Hardy-Weinberg principle is expressed algebraically as 2 + 2PQ + Q2, where P and
Qare the percentages of thepopulation having two differentalleles. For example, where
P and Q are Rh positive and Rh negative respectively and where Rh positive blood
occurs in 60% of the population and Rh negative blood occurs in 40% of the population,
the equation tells us that p2 = .36, 2PQ = .48, and Q2 = .16. Since .36 + .48 + .16 = 1, the
population is in Hardy-Weinberg "equilibrium" for these alleles. People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985,993 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 85. There are some
who question the precision of DNA profiling based upon the Hardy-Weinberg
principal:
[Eixamination of some of the data bases used for forensics reveals that they
deviate grossly from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium; ... [Pirocedures used to
calculate allele frequencies in the data base are inconsistent with the procedures
used for declaring a match between forensic samples, with the result that the
reported odds of a match may greatly overstate the true probability ....
Eric S. Lander, Population Genetic Considerations in the Forensic Use of DNA Typing, 32
BANBURY REPORT: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 143, 153 (1989). See infra
notes 145-156 and accompanying text.
11 While the methodology is to exclude the putative father as the biological father, if
exclusion does not occur then the putative father must still be suspect. There comes the
point where if the results of all the exclusion tests are negative, a probability of paternity
(inclusion) is determined. See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
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that a properly conducted positive paternity test is wrong is astronomically
remote.12
The second significant factor of the new paternity test is that state legislatures
must now respond quickly to this new technology.13 Currently, although many
states have attempted to "modernize" their paternity statutes in one way or
another,14 legal battles are being and have been fought over basic statutory
12 Theoretically, if every single gene of the child, the mother and the putative father
could be tested, and no test result excluded the putative father, then a perfect 100%
inclusion would be achieved. While it is impossible-or at least impracticable-to test
every gene, it is currently possible to narrow the chances that a putative father is not the
biological father almost to an absolute of zero. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841,845
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (scientific testimony that DNA tests showed the chances that
the defendant was not the donor of the DNA was I in 839,914,540 or .0000012%).
13 Even the federal government, under the Aid to Families With Dependent Children
("AFDC') Act, has promoted genetic testing to determine paternity and has conditioned
states' receiptof federal monies on such legislation. 42 U.S.C.A. 666(a)(5)(A) (West 1991).
DNA profiling is becoming an accepted method to determine paternity in many
jurisdictions. Barbara A. v. Gerald J., 553 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Fam. Ct. 1990); District of
Columbia ex rel. J.A.B. v. W.R., 17 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1499 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div.
1991). See generally SIDNEY B. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 11B.07 (4th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992). However, some commentators are concerned about the
application of DNA profiling to criminal investigations. See Gina Kolata, Justice System
Takes a Hard Look at Scientific Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at E6. See infra notes
198-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences between civil and
criminal forensic uses of DNA profiling.
14The diversity and differences between the paternity statutes in all fifty states is too
voluminous to present. These specific differences, however, are not the subject of our
concern. What does concern us is that these differences do exist and that there is no
uniformity. Moreover, since all jurisdictions have and are moving towards uniformity
in many areas of law, there is no reason that a uniform code could not be applied.
However, past attempts at a uniform code have failed dismally. The most successful is
the Uniform Parentage Act ('UPA") which allows the admission into evidence of an
expert's opinion concerning the statistical probability of the putative father's paternity
based upon the result of a blood test. Unif. Parentage Act § 12(3), 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987
and Supp. 1992). Only eighteen states have adopted the UPA: Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington and
Wyoming. Id. at 287. Next in popularity is the Uniform Act on Paternity ("UAP") which
allows determinations based only upon the agreement by all the experts. Unif. Act on
Paternity § 10, 9B U.L.A. 362 (1987 and Supp. 1992). Only six states have adopted the
UAP: Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Utah. Id. at
347. [Note that Rhode Island has adopted parts of both]. There is also the Uniform Act
on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity ("UABTDP") which has been superseded-for
the most part - by the UPA. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES § 144 (2d ed. 1987). Currently, only Oklahoma, Oregon and
Pennsylvania, and to some extent, California, use the UABTDP. All other jurisdictions
have either a mixture of all three model acts or completely independent, and different,
legislation. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050 (1991) ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-847
(1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-168 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-10-1 (Michie 1991); IDAHO
CODE § 7-1116 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-8 (Bums 1991); IOWA CODE § 675.4
(1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:396-9:398 (West 1991); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
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construction simply because the laws have not kept current with the new
technology.15 Moreover, some of those states which have "modernized" their
paternity statutes have not legislated a comprehensive paternity determination
law. Therefore, all state legislatures should immediately create statutes
reflecting the near precision of this technology by adopting model legislation,
such as the Uniform Paternity Determination Act ("UPDA") suggested in this
Article. Already at least twenty-one states have passed legislation which
creates a presumption of paternity if the current test results are above a certain
probability of paternity percentage; these laws shift the burden of proof to the
putative father who must prove by either a preponderance of the evidence or
by clear and convincing evidence that he is not the father.16 However, the issues
§ 5-1029 (1991); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209C (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1414 (1990); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT. § 532 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-954 (Law Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-7 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-7-112 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 415 (1991).
15 See, e.g., Le Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (DNA profiling
test of deceased putative father did not show clear and convincing evidence of paternity
required by California intestacy law as well as the fact that there is no provision under
any California law for DNA profiling to provide presumptive proof of parentage);
Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 490 N.E.2d 788, 792 (Mass. 1986) (statute, specifically
referring to "blood grouping tests", did not include HLA test because it is a tissue typing
procedure); Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (HLA test does not
appear on its face to be a blood grouping test). Cf. Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240,
1242 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983) (HLA test is not a blood test but admissible because Congress
could not have intended to prohibit a test that did not exist at the time of legislation).
16ARK. CODE STAT. ANN. § 9-27-342(h)(2)(B) (Michie 1992) (paternity presumed if
probability of paternity is above 95% and allegation is corroborated by biological
mother's testimony); CAL. EVID. CODE § 895.5(a) (Deering 1992) (paternity presumed if
paternity index is 100 to 1 or higher but rebuttable by preponderance of the evidence);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(0 (1991) (paternity presumed if probability is 97% or higher
but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.12(1) (1991)
(paternity presumed if probability is 95% or higher but rebuttable (no statutory
standard)); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-44 (1992) (paternity presumed if probability is 97°% or
higher but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para.
2511(f)(4) (1991) (paternity presumed if combined paternity index is at least 500 to 1 but
rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence); Iowa SF2316 (1992) (paternity presumed
if 95% or higher but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 406.111 (Baldwin, 1992) (paternity presumed if probability is 99% or higher or
paternity index is 100 to 1 or greater but rebuttable by preponderance of evidence);
MICH. COMp. LAws § 722.716(5) (1991) (paternity presumed if probability is 99% or
higher but rebuttable (no statutory standard)); MINN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(a) (1991)
(paternity presumed if probability is 99% but rebuttable by clear and convincing
evidence); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-234(3)(b) (1992) (paternity presumed if 95% or
higher but rebuttable by preponderance of the evidence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 522:4()(c) & 522:4(I)(d) (1991) (paternity presumed if probability is 97% but
rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5(D) (Michie
1992) (paternity presumed if probability is 99% or higher but rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3111.03(A)(5) (Anderson 1992) (paternity
presumed if probability is 95% or higher but rebuttable by clear and convincing
evidence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 504(C) (West 1991) (paternity presumed if
probability is 95% but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence); TEX. FAM. CODE
1992-93]
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of jurisdiction standing, conflict of laws, presumptions, testing procedures and
other issues need to be addressed so that all states' paternity laws are uniform
and comprehensive.
Moreover, because DNA profiling has been incorporated into the traditional
paternity test by several major testing laboratories, the cost of these tests are no
longer exorbitant. Thus, with the economic impediment eliminated states may
now legislate that the test creates a substantive presumption of paternity.
Because the percentage of certainty so approaches 100 percent, statutes creating
such a presumption should be found constitutional. 17 Therefore, the judicial
systems of those states adopting the UPDA will most likely never have to spend
the public's money-along with eliminating the parties' agony-on a paternity
trial in the future, except in rare instances, 18 because there will almost never be
any substantive issues of fact to try.
This Article will first briefly examine the historical development of the
paternity suit in the beginning of Part II. Part II will then focus upon the
standards of proof, presumptions and affirmative defenses concomitant to the
ANN. § 13.06(c) (West 1992) (paternity presumed if probability of exclusion is 95% which
shifts burden of proof); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-45a-10 (Mitchie 1992) (paternity presumed
if paternity index is 100 or higher but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(B) (Michie 1991) (paternity presumed ifprobability is 98% orhigher
and no rebuttal); W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-3(a)(3) (1992) (probability of paternity of 98% is
clear and convincing evidence of paternity); WIS. STAT. § 767.48(b)(1) (1989-1990)
(paternity presumed if probability is 99% or higher but rebuttable (no statutory
standard)); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-109(e)(iv) (1991) (paternity presumed if probability is 97%
but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence).
17This presumption would not only shift the burden of proof to the other party, but
also could raise the standard of proof from a preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, it is possible that
some jurisdictions might want to create an irrebuttable-or conclusive-presumption.
The constitutionality of the conclusive presumption was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in 1989. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding California's
conclusive presumption of legitimacy even though the putative father's probability of
paternity was 98.07%). See Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The
Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1991); Joan C. Sylvain, Note,
Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 831 (1990).
Curiously, if California legislated a positive DNA paternity test as a conclusive
presumption, then Michael H. might have been decided differently if the conclusive
presumption of paternity overrode the conclusive presumption of legitimacy. See
Atkinson v. Hall, 556 A.2d 651 (Me. 1989). If the presumptions are both rebuttable, the
rebuttal standards would decide which presumption would prevail. For example, if in
Michael H. the presumption of legitimacy were rebuttable only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and if a positive DNA paternity test were rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence, the result would still have been the same because the presumption
of legitimacy would "trump" the presumption of paternity. See also infra notes 68-84 and
accompanying text.
18Assuming there could be a rare situation where DNA profiling would not be
determinative of paternity, the traditional affirmative defenses should be left in place
and available to a defendant. However, the burdens of production and persuasion
would be great. See infra text at 44-46.
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traditional paternity action. Part III will examine the concepts and legal
applications behind blood group/genetic marker testing and the probability
formulas derived from these tests used to exclude or include a putative father.
Part IV will examine the technology behind DNA paternity testing and its
current evidentiary admissibility. Part V will discuss some of the substantive
and public policy issues relating to paternity determinations. Finally, in Part
VI, we offer our version of a possible model uniform paternity statute which
would create either a rebuttable or a conclusive presumption when the
paternity test results achieve a certain level indicating paternity.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PATERNITY SUIT
It should be understood that almost all filiation proceedings are brought not
just to adjudicate paternity but to achieve some other legal right associated with
paternity. Usually it is the child's mother who brings the action to establish the
putative father's support obligation.19 Today, most paternity actions are
brought by government agencies, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of the
mother who is seeking contribution from the putative father to support the
child on public assistance.20 In some instances, however, it is the father who
19Some states' statutes are ambiguous as to whether the woman who brings the
action must be unmarried or whether only a married woman has standing to sue. See
State v. Hunt, 368 P.2d 261 (Utah 1962); State v. Tucker, 486 P.2d 1072 (Wash. 1971).
20See Jason Deparle, Big Rise in Births Outside Wedlock, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1993, at
Al, A14. There is a "spectacular rise in out-of-wedlock births." Erik Eckholm, Solutions
on Welfare: They All Cost Money, N.Y. TIMEs, July 26, 1992, at Al, A18. In 1980, in which
over 600,000 out of wedlock births occurred, there were some 150,000 paternity
determinations. Harry D. Krause, Concerns of the Legal Professions, in INCLUSIONS
PROBABILITIESIN PARENTAGETESTING 13 (R. Walker ed. 1983). In 1991, Health and Human
Services Secretary Dr. Louis W. Sullivan reported that a record number of
paternities-400,000-were established in 1990, a year in which well over a million out
of wedlock births occurred. Child SupportReport, Office of Child Support Enforcement,
Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
May 1991, at 1.
The following table illustrates the recent increases in out-of-wedlock births
occurring in the United States:
BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES







1970 398,700 -- -
1992-931
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brings the action in order to establish his visitation rights.21 Paternity suits are
also used to provide evidence of adultery in a divorce.2 2 In some states the
child, whether of minority or majority age, may initiate the action in order to
establish inheritance rights, citizenship rights or support rights. 23 Dependent
rights under worker compensation laws have turned on paternity
determinations.24 The action has been used as a defense to a defamation suit25
and to convict rapists. 26 The federal government has even used it to enforce
immigration laws by challenging the claims of foreigners who declared
citizenship by descendence. 27
A. Origins Of The Paternity Action
Historically, the origin of the paternity action is best examined by its
relationship to illegitimacy. For as long as society has had the institution of
marriage, it has also had the problem of illegitimacy. By definition, an
illegitimate child is a child born out-of-wedlock or of adultery.28 The traditional
word for an out of wedlock child was a "bastard,"29 and the paternity action of
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992 69 (112th ed.
1992).
21 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (paternity action by putative
father valid but barred by statutory presumption of legitimacy). But see Roe v. Roe, 316
N.Y.S.2d 94 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (no standing for putative father to bring paternity action).
22 See, e.g., Dellaria v. Dellaria, 52 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Anthony v. Anthony,
74 A.2d 919 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950).
23 Both the UPA and the UAP specifically permit the child to bring the action. Unif.
Parentage Act § 6, 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987 & Supp. 1991); Unif. Act on Paternity § 2, 9B
U.L.A. 352 (1987 & Supp. 1991). See also CLARK, supra note 14, § 4.4.
24R.LJ. v. Western Sprinklers, Inc., 844 P.2d 37 (Kan. App. 1992); Killingsworth v.
City of Wichita, 830 P.2d 70 (Kan. App. 1992).
25 See King v. Tanner, 539 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (plaintiff's slander suit based
on defendant's defamation that he was the father of her child dismissed on the defense
of truth of paternity established by DNA profiling calculating his probability of
paternity to be 99.993%).
26 See, e.g., State v. Talton, 497 A.2d 35 (Conn. 1985); People v. Alzoubi, 479 N.E.2d
1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); State v. Jackson, 358 S.E.2d 679 (N.C. 1987); People v. Wesley,
533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Albany County Ct. 1988), companion case afJd, People v. Bailey, 549
N.Y.S.2d 846 (App. Div. 1989), affd, People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App. Div. 1992);
State v. Hill, 570 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hartman, 426 N.W.2d 320
(Wis. 1988).
27 Lue Chow Kon v. Brownell, 122 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd, 220 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1955).
28See 10 CJ.S. Bastards § 1 (1938) and 14 C.J.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock § 2 (1991) for
a survey of the various statutory or judicial definitions.
29
"Bastard, from the French bas, low or base, and stard, start, editus, ortus, sprung,
signifies literally base born." GEORGE CRA BB, A HISTORYOF ENGLISH LAW: OR AN ATrEMpT
TO TRACE THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND SUCCESSIVE CHANGES, OF THE COMMON LAW FROM THE
[Vol. 7:1
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the past was called a "bastardy proceeding."30 Whether or not the father's
identity was known was irrelevant to declaring a child a bastard. Even if the
father came forward to claim the child as his own, the child still held the status
of bastard because the test has always been the marital status-i.e., the
unmarried state-of the mother at the time of birth.31
In ancient times, the solution to the problem of illegitimacy was simple: the
pregnant unmarried or adulterous woman was executed. 32 Old testament law
required that an adulterer and adulteress be stoned to death.33 Under such a
public policy, there was never the legal need to establish paternity.
Roman society held a different attitude towards adultery and unmarried
sexual relations among citizens.34 Under Roman law, a Vestal Virgin who had
lost her chastity was ceremoniously buried alive.35 Capital punishment,
however, was not the standard Roman punishment for the ordinary unchaste
EARLIEST PERIODS TO THE PRESENT TIME 89 (American ed. 1987). "'Bastardy' may describe
or define not only the condition of a bastard, or the condition of being an illegitimate
child, but also the offense or act of begetting a bastard or illegitimate child." 10 C.J.S.
Bastards § 1 (1938). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 152 (6th ed. 1990). Today, the
preference is to use the term "out-of-wedlock child" instead of the stigmatized term
"illegitimate child".
30See 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 1 (1938). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 152 (6th ed. 1990).
This is also known as a filiation or affiliation proceeding. Id.
31 Obviously, this definition, based upon the status of a woman, was a practical and
convenient method to test illegitimacy because status was a fact which could easily be
proved. Traditionally, the proof problems associated with determining the biological
father were quite onerous. See infra text at 12-20. However, the question of adulterine
bastardy, where the child is born to a married-but adulterous-woman, complicates
the definition of illegitimacy and the determination of paternity because of the
presumption of legitimacy. See infra text at 13-16.
3 2 JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN ExAMINATION OF BASTARDY 53 (1982)
("Questions and difficulties about guardianship, custody and property of illegitimate
children do not arise if illegitimate children are fated to die in their mother's wombs.").
33
"And the man who committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he who
committeth adultery with his neighbor's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall
surely be put to death." Leviticus 20:10. 'If a man be found lying with a woman married
to an husband, then they shall both of them die, both the man that lay with the woman,
and the woman.... If a damsel who is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a
man find her in the city, and lie with her, [t]hen ye shall bring them both out unto the
gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die .... " Deuteronomy
22:22-24. Cf. Deuteronomy 22:28-29 ("If a man find a damsel who is a virgin, who is not
betrothed, and lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found, [tihen ... she shall
be his wife .... "). Death was also the punishment for adultery under Islamic law.
TEICHMAN, supra note 32, at 53.
34See generally Robbins & Deak, The Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A
Comparative Study, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 308 (1930).
351 PLUTARCH, LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS & ROMANS 339, 345 (1914).
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woman and thus many out-of-wedlock children werebom.36 Although Roman
society recognized the right of existence of the out-of-wedlock child, Roman
law nevertheless declared this child to be filius nullius-a child of no
one-which precluded the child from asserting both support and succession
rights. 37 It was possible, however, for the child to obtain these rights either
through subsequent adoption or legitimation by the father.38 But under Roman
law there was no filiation action available to either the mother or child which
could force the declaration of paternity and bestow its associated benefits.39
Under Canon Law, illegitimacy was viewed as a condition imposed upon a
child as a punishment for the sin of the parents who conceived the child
out-of-wedlock. 40 Similar to Roman jurisprudence, the out-of-wedlock child
could be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents.4 1 Also, like
Roman society, ecclesiastical society did not allow either the mother or the child
to obtain a declaration of paternity.42 Thus, both ancient and medieval
civilizations protected the putative father to the detriment of the mother and
child by refusing to force the father to recognize his true biological relationship
to those children born out-of-wedlock.
The concept offilius nullius was carried over to the English common law.43
As such, the out-of-wedlock child could not seek support from either parent
but instead had to join the ranks of the poor and destitute who depended on
the parishes and boroughs for help.44 -This heavy burden placed on the parishes
3 6 TEICHMAN, supra note 32, at 53. These children were divided into two groups: the
nothi and the spurii. The nothi were the children born to a concubine and these children
had some legal claims on the father for support. Thespuriiwere all other out-of-wedlock
children, and these had no support rights whatsoever. Id.
37 See generally Robbins & Deak, supra note 34.
38TEICHMAN, supra note 32, at 54.
391t should be noted that although many illegitimate children were born in Roman
society, the common practice of "exposing" unwanted infants to death significantly
reduced the illegitimate population. Many of the nothi, particularly the female infants,
and most of the spurii met this fate. Id. at 54.
40JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 263 (1971).
41TEICHMAN, supra note 32, at 54.
4 2 See generally R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987). See
R.H. Helmholz, Bastardy Litigation in Medieval England, 13 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 360, 367-82
(1969).
4 3 See 1 WILLIAM B.ACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES 447 (1769). See also R.H. Helmholz,
Support Orders, Church Courts,and the Rule ofFilius Nullius:A Reassessment of the Common
Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431 (1977). An illegitimate child was regarded by the court as a
'stranger" to his parents. See In reLloyd, 133 Eng. Rep. 1259 (C.P. 1841). Yet the "stranger"
relationship was ignored by the court when marriage between parent and child was
proposed; a father could not marry his illegitimate daughter nor a mother her
illegitimate son. SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 1.02(1).
44 TEICHMAN, supra note 32, at 60.
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led to the Poor Law Act of 157645 which authorized justices of the peace to order
the punishment of both the child's mother and the man responsible for
fathering the bastard.46 It also authorized a bastardy order requiring the mother,
the putative father or both to make periodic payments "or other sustenation"
for the relief of the child. 47
This was the beginning of the paternity suit in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. Although the purpose of the Act was to impose support
obligations on both the mother and the adjudicated father, it is important to
note that the action began as a criminal-not civil-proceeding. Thus it was
the general public who was to benefit from its enactment. Succeeding
legislation was also designed to indemnify the public. 48 It was not until the
nineteenth century that Parliament passed the New Poor Act of 183449 which
modified the paternity suit dramatically by decriminalizing the status of the
unmarried woman.50 However, this Act put the liability of care directly on the
mother and forbade her to sue the putative father.51 This disability did not last
long because ten years later the proscription was lifted and the mother was
allowed to directly seek support from the father for the benefit of the child. 52
Thus, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the paternity
suit substantially developed into the action we know today under the common
law.
Similarly, in the United States, the bastardy proceeding followed the common
law or was modified by individual state statute. Notably, while most states
authorized the paternity suit as a civil action, some states have maintained the
criminal aspect of the common law action and have criminal remedies imposed
upon a father who willfully neglects to support his out-of-wedlock child. 53
These statutes are not, however, criminal actions to punish out-of-wedlock
procreation but use the paternity suit to prosecute the neglectful putative
4518 Eliz. 1, ch. 3 (1576) (Eng.).
464 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 156-57 (3d ed. 1945). See also
CRABB, supra note 29, at 503-04.
47SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 1.02(1).
481d. § 1.02(3).
49An Act for the Amendment and better Administration of the Laws relating to the
Poor in England and Wales, 4-5 Will. 4, ch. 76 (1834) (Eng.).
50TEICHMAN, supra note 32, at 65.
511d. The statute, however, did not preclude the boroughs and parishes from bringing
suitagainst the putative father to either punish him or to enforce his support obligations.
Id.
52An Act for the further Amendment of the Laws relating to the Poor in England, 7
& 8 Vict., ch. 101 (1844) (Eng.). See SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 1.02 (3).
53 E.g., Timm v. State, 54 N.W.2d 46 (Wis. 1952). Cf. State ex rel. Samowski v. Fox,
119 N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 1963) (mother's uncorroborated testimony, while not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, produces a guilty verdict against putative father).
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father.54 Nevertheless, both the civil and criminal case law relating to paternity
determinations have demonstrated considerable variety, and even with the
introduction of the Uniform Parentage Act and the Uniform Act on Paternity,
American jurisdictions still differ on the basic determination elements as to the
standards of proof and admissibility of evidence.55
B. The Burdens, Presumptions And Evidence Of The Paternity Action
The burden of proving paternity has always been upon the one who brings
the action (whether this was the man or the woman, an individual or a group)
and it was upon the plaintiff to prove by either a preponderance of the evidence,
by clear and convincing evidence, or by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
depending upon the jurisdiction, that the putative father was the biological
father of the child in question.56 Some courts held that if a woman declared
that she had sexual relations with the putative father, she had established a
prima facie case, and the burden shifted to the defendant.5 7 Other courts
required corroboration of the woman's testimony to carry the burden forward
and to shift it to the other party.58 Nevertheless, whoever had the burden
obviously had a most difficult problem of proof because of the lack of
admissible physical evidence-or for that matter, of any physical evidence at
all. In effect, the case would most often turn solely on which party told the more
believable story. Thus, most paternity actions became nothing more than
swearing contests before the trier of fact.59
There were basically only two affirmative defenses available to the
defendant. 60 The first was to show the incapability of having sexual relations
54 State v. Dixon, 127 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1962); State ex rel. Toryak v. Spagnuolo, 292
S.E.2d 654 (W. Va. 1982).
55 See supra note 14.
56 See Isaacson v. Obendorf, 581 P.2d 350 (Idaho 1978); People ex rel. Elkin v. Rimicci,
240 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); People v. Finks, 72 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. 1955); X v. Y,
482 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 1971). See also Jo-Dee Favre-Jones, Rivera v. Minnich: Paternity Suits
and the Negligible Burden of Proof, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 803 (1988); Richard P. Perna, The
Uniform Reciprocal Enforceinent ofSupport Act and the Defense ofNon-Pa ternity: A Functional
Analysis, 73 Ky. L.J. 75, 105-06 (1984); Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital
Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 369, 370-72 (1988).
57 See, e.g., McGuire v. State, 326 P.2d 362 (Ariz. 1958); Medina v. Gonzales, 347 P.2d
138 (Colo. 1959); State ex rel. Samowski v. Fox, 119 N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 1963).
58 See, e.g., Lockman v. Fulton, 76 N.W.2d 452 (Neb. 1956); State ex rel. Klostermeier
v. Klostermeier, 72 N.W.2d 848 (Neb. 1955).
59 Perhaps the extraordinary Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Justice
Clarence Thomas focusing on the issues of sexual harassment best demonstrate the
inherent problems of an action based on very little physical and testimonial evidence
other than the spoken words of the principals.
60It must be noted that the defendant could be (and usually was) the puta tive father;
however the defendant could also be the biological mother or the father of record.
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during the time of conception.6 1 Incapability was divided into two specific
assertions. The first assertion of incapability was to prove that there was
physical absence and/or spatial distance between the man and the woman so
that neither party had "access" to one another during the time of conception. 62
The second of the incapability assertions was to plead and prove that the man
was impotent or sterile. 63
The other affirmative defense was the doctrine of exceptio plurium
concubentium or the doctrine of multiple access.64 If the defendant could prove
that the mother had sexual relations with a man other than the putative father
during the time of conception, the action would be dismissed as a matter of
law.65
Other than the prima facie case and the affirmative defenses, there were only
two other significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that
both parties had to face. The first was the presumption of legitimacy, which if
available to the defendant would cause the paternity suit to be dismissed.66
The second was a trial technique known as "bald eagle" evidence which caused
many emotional-though not very scientific-declarations of paternity.67
1. The Presumption of Legitimacy
The presumption of legitimacy is an age-old doctrine which was applied
whenever a paternity action involved a child who was born to a husband and
wife during a valid marriage. 68 If the presumption was applicable, usually
because the defense of incapability was unavailable, the action would be
dismissed as a matter of law.69 It is well often repeated that the presumption is
61SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 1.05.
62State ex rel. Munoz v. Bravo, 678 P.2d 974 (Ariz. 1984); Hanley v. Wilcox, 395
N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div. 1977); Gray v. Rose, 302 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1962).
63Murdock v. Murdock, 480 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Hanley v. Flanigan, 428
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Fam. Ct. 1980).
64See Stephen L. Sass, The Defense of Multiple Access (Exceptia Plurium Concubentium)
in Paternity Suits: A Comparative Analysis, 51 TUL. L. REV. 468 (1977).
65Yarmark v. Strickland, 193 So. 2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
66 0f course, if it were proved that the husband had been incapacitated bynonaccess,
sterility or impotency, the defendant would not have the benefit of the presumption. See
infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
671n the notorious case of Berry v. Chaplin, bald eagle evidence contributed to a jury
disregarding the results of a blood test. See Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442,452 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1946). See also infra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
68M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 122-25 (1988).
69See Kevin L. Petrasic, Note, Cutchember v. Payne: Approaching Perfection in
Paternity Testing, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 228 n.3 (Fall 1984).
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one of the strongest in the law and most difficult to overcome. 70 Its purpose
was grounded in the fundamental public policy that a legitimate child should
not, sometime later on in life, be declared illegitimate. This policy was what
prompted Chief Judge Lord Mansfield to state this most famous rule of
evidence:
The law of England is clear that a declaration of a father or mother
cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue born after marriage. It is a
rule founded on decency, morality and policy that they shall not be
permitted to say after a marriage that thq, have had no connection and
therefore that the offspring is spurious.
Still the best commentary on the presumption of legitimacy is found in the
1930 New York case of In re Findlay72 where Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo,
along with a unanimous New York Court of Appeals, held that "the
presumption will not fail unless common sense and reason are outraged by a
holding that it abides. ' 73 The case was not a paternity suit but a probate
proceeding brought by the decedent's brother seeking to revoke letters of
administration granted to the decedent's half-brother.74 The surrogate court,
by applying the presumption of legitimacy, found for the half-brother, and on
appeal, the appellate court affirmed based on the strength of the
presumption.75
70 See Bernheimer v. First National Bank, 225 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1949); Hanley v.
Flanigan, 428 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Fam. Ct. 1980); Ewell v. Ewell, 79 S.E. 509 (S.C. 1913). See
also J. LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 252 (1923); W.
WANENMACHER, CANONICAL EVIDENCE IN MARRIAGE CASES 244 (1935).
71Goodnight v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1258 (1777).
72253 N.Y. 1 (1930).
731d. at 8.
74The facts of this case illustrate why the presumption could not be permitted to
stand. A woman had two families. Id. at 4-5. Her first family included two sons, Alfred
and Albert Brooks, and her second family included another son, William Findlay. Id.
Albert Brooks, at the age of nineteen, went to live with his mother and her second
husband, and even changed his name to John Findlay. Id. at 5. This second marriage,
however, was never valid since the first marriage had notbeen dissolved. Id. Many years
later, when Albert Brooks-now legally known as John Findlay-died intestate, his
half-brother William Findlay was made the administrator of the estate. Id. at 6.
Full-brother Alfred Brooks sued, based upon the fact that William was not a full-blood
relative. Id. William presented the ingenious argument that because the first marriage
had never been dissolved, his father could only have been-under the presumption of
legitimacy-Mr. Brooks and not Mr. Findlay. Thus, by applying the presumption, the
surrogate court declared that William had to be a "Brooks" and not a "Findlay." Id.
Therefore, he was the legitimate heir to the estate and qualified to be the administrator
of the estate. Id.
751n re Findlay's Administrator, 236 N.Y.S. 489, 497 (App. Div. 1929).
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The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court by refuting the power of the
presumption. 76 Judge Cardozo, in an articulate and well-reasoned opinion,
began by acknowledging that
[p]otent, indeed, the presumption is, one of the strongest and most
persuasive known to the law ... and yet subject to the sway of reason.
Time was, the books tell us ... [that] if a husband, not physically
incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of
gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his
paternity. The presumption in such circumstances was said to be
conclusive.
77
However, Cardozo discovered that there was English precedent which
"exploded" the rule of the four seas "on account of its absolute nonsense."78 He
and the New York Court of Appeals would follow this other precedent and
abandoned the "nonsense" of the [presumption] .... We [will] no
longer adhere to Lord Campbell's dictum... that a mulatto child born
of a white mother must be ascribed to the white husband, and not to
the black paramour if the husband had access to his wife during the
period of gestation. 9
The court, however, made it clear that it was not abandoning the presumption
per se but merely the "follies and vagaries" inherent in the presumption.80
Today the presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable, although the
presumption is still strong in many jurisdictions.81 It may be rebutted by the
traditional defense of incapability.82 Many jurisdictions now allow the
presumption to fail by blood and tissue tests.83 However, some states still
impose procedural roadblocks to such a degree that the presumption is
76 In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7 (1930).
7 7 1d. at 7.
781d. The English precedents contrary to the presumption were Pendrell v. Pendrell,
2 Strange 925 (1732) and Rex v. Luffe, 8 East 193 (1807).
791d. at 12-13.
801d.
81See, e.g., McKenzie v. Harris, 679 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Brown v. Danley, 566 S.W.2d 385 (Ark. 1978); Holland v. Holland, 449 A.2d 1010 (Conn.
1982); Happel v. Mecklenburger, 427 N.E.2d 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); P.B.C. v. D.H., 483
N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985); State v. White, 268 S.E.2d 481 (N.C. 1980); Etchison v.
Greathouse, 596 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980);.
82Haugen v. Swanson, 16 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 1949).
83 E.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 478 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. 1972); Santiago v. Silva, 413
N.E.2d 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Beck v. Beck, 304 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973);
Simmons v. Simmons, 479 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1972); Commonwealth v. Stappen, 143
N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1957); Shephard v. Shephard, 265 N.W.2d 374 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978);
Groulx v. Groulx, 103 A.2d 188 (N.H. 1954).
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still-for all intents and purposes-conclusive. 84 Thus, some states continue to
engage in a fiction by denying the recognition of true biological relationships.
2. Bald Eagle Evidence
The lack of tangible physical evidence in the traditional paternity suit
perhaps is the reason why English and American courts allowed the admission
of what is now called "bald eagle 85 evidence. Simply put, bald eagle evidence
is when the like or unlike resemblance between the child and the putative father
is proffered as testimony or demonstrated to the jury. Bald eagle evidence can
be traced to the ancient city of Carthage where children, upon reaching the age
of two, were examined by a special committee; if their resemblance to the father
was not great, they were killed. 86
Since the 1600s, English courts have allowed the admission of bald eagle
evidence.87 In the 1769 Douglas Peerage Case, which decided a delicate paternity
question involving nobility, Chief Judge Lord Mansfield declared that he
always considered likeness as an argument of a child's being the son
of a parent; and the rather as the distinction between individuals in the
human species is more discernible than in other animals. A man may
survey ten thousand people before he sees two faces perfectly alike;
and in an army of a hundred thousand men every one may be known
from the other. If there should be a likeness of features, there may be a
discriminancy of voice, a difference in the gesture, the smile, and
various other things; whereas a family-likeness generally runs through
all these; for in everything there is a resemblance, as of features, size,
attitude, and action.... It seems nature had implanted in the children
what is not in the parents .... Among eleven black rabbits, there will
scarce be found one to produce a white one.
88
In one eighteenth century case, the evidence of resemblance of the defendant
father to the child was stated as "frequently fanciful, and therefore the jury
should be well convinced that it did exist; but if they were so convinced, it was
84 E.g., CAL. EID. CODE § 621 (West 1991). This was the statute at issue in Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117 (1989). See supra note 17.
85This evidentiary method or trial technique is called "bald eagle" because it is based
on the notion that if it looks like a bald eagle, then it probably is. This, of course, is a
variation of the venerable "duck test." Statement by Emily Granrud, Oct. 14,1991. E.g.,
"[w]hereas it looks like a duck, and whereas it walks like a duck, and whereas it quacks
like a duck, we therefore hold that it is a duck." Dole v. Williams Enterprises, 876 F.2d
186, 189 n.2 (D.C.C. 1989); see also Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va.
1990). Applying this test to a paternity suit, the animal imagery of a bareheaded infant
obviously lent itself more to the head of an eagle than to the head of a duck.
86STRABO, GEOGRAPHY (circa 10 A.D.). See also SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 3.08.
87See generally 1A JOHN HENRY.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 166 (Tillers ed. 1983).
88Douglas Peerage Case, 2 Hargr. Collect. Jurid. 402 (1769).
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impossible to have stronger evidence."89 Resemblance has also been used as
evidence of nonpaternity, such as in the case of Morris v. Davies9° where the
putative father defendant used the resemblance of the grown child to his wife's
paramour to defend and defeat an action brought by that child for property
rights.
As in early England, some American courts in the 1800s considered bald eagle
evidence relevant, admissible and sometimes conclusive. 91 In Gilnanton v.
Ham, decided in 1859, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that
[t]he practice of bringing before the jury, on trials for bastardy, the child
whose paternity is sought to be established, when living, has been
almost universal in this State, from the earliest recollection of the oldest
practitioners. . . . If the child were referred to at all, its general
appearance, its complexion and features, might properly be
commented upon; and we think under the well-established
physiological law that like begets like, and that generally there is a
striking resemblance... between the parent and the child. 2
Because bald eagle evidence was a trial technique unique to a paternity
proceeding, it was recognized that there existed a grave potential for abuse of
such evidence by a persuasive or sympathetic plaintiff.93 It was argued that the
jury could unjustly imagine the resemblance because they were persuaded by
or had sympathy for the plaintiff or child. Thus, some American courts chose
not to follow the precedent of the English decisions and found bald eagle
evidence inadmissible.94 One New England court, describing the ephemeral
quality of an infant's features during the first few weeks or months of life, stated
that
[w]hile it may be a well-known physiological fact that peculiarities of
form, feature, and personality traits are oftentimes transmitted from
parent to child, yet it is equally true as a matter of common knowledge
that during the first few weeks, or even months of a child's existence,
it has that peculiar immaturity of features which characterize it as an
infant, and that it changes often and very much in looks and
89Day v. Day (Assizes 1797) (quoted in NICHOLAS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
ADULTERINE BASTARDY 140 (1836) and WIGMORE, supra note 87, § 166) (emphasis added).
903 C. & P. 214,5 Cl. & F. 63 (1827, 1836).
91See Paulk v. State, 52 Ala. 427 (1875); Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160 (1854); Gilmanton
v. Ham, 38 N.H. 108 (1859); Gaunt v. State, 14 A. 600 (N.J. 1888); State v. Britt, 78 N.C.
439 (1878); State v. Woodruff, 67 N.C. 89 (1872). See generally Courtney Kenny, Physical
Resemblance as Evidence of Consanguinity, 39 LAW Q. REv. 297 (1923). See also WIGMORE
supra note 87, § 166.
92 Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N.H. 108, 112-13 (1859).
93 WIGMORE, supra note 87, § 166.
94 Se, e.g., State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa 43 (1878); Keniston v. Rowe, 16 Me. 38 (1839);
Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876); Eddy v. Gray, 4 All. 435 (Mass. 1862).
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appearance during that period. Resemblance can then be readily
imagined.... And in a trial in bastardy proceedings the mere fact that
a resemblance is claimed would be too likely to lead captive the
imagination of the jury, and they would fancy they could see points of
resemblance between the child and the putative father.
95
Today, the admissibility of bald eagle evidence has no uniformity whatsoever
among the states, and it runs the full gamut from absolute competence to
absolute incompetence. A few states flatly reject bald eagle evidence, whether
by witnesses or exhibition, to the extent that there can be no mention or
comparison of hair or eye color.96 Some states allow the exhibition of the child
but will not admit testimonial evidence of resemblance.97 Other jurisdictions
hold that both exhibition and testimonial evidence are admissible but only if
the child is old enough to have well-defined features to make the comparison
meaningful; this, however, can mean anywhere from two months to two
years.98 Some jurisdictions allow the child to be present in the courtroom so
long as no comparisons to the putative father are attempted. 99 Some states do
not allow evidence of a general resemblance but admit evidence comparing
specific features. 100 One state admits bald eagle evidence only to show
illegitimacy. 01 Finally, there are those states which allow the trial court
absolute discretion to admit such evidence. 102
Thus, it can be seen that bald eagle evidence greatly varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Moreover, the certainty that the evidence will or will not be
admitted is subject to change. For example, a court that otherwise excludes bald
eagle evidence may permit expert testimony on resemblance by some certified
95Clark v. Bradstreet, 15 A. 56 (Me. 1888).
96Flores v. State, 73 So. 234 (Fla. 1916); Clark v. Bradstreet, 15 A. 56 (Me. 1888);
Bilkovie v. Loeb, 141 N.Y.S. 279 (App. Div. 1913); Ratzloff v. State, 229 P. 278 (Okla.
1924).
97Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876); Scott v. Donovan, 26 N.E. 871 (Mass. 1891).
98State v. Harvey, 84 N.W. 535 (Iowa 1900) (bald eagle evidence allowed only if infant
over two years old); State v. Danforth, 60 A. 839 (N.H. 1905) (baldeagleevidence admitted
for an infant only a few months of age).
99State v. Patmberg, 97 S.W. 566 (Mo. 1906); Ingram v. State, 37 N.W. 943 (Neb. 1888);
Johnson v. State, 113 N.W. 674 (Wis. 1907).
10 l1n re R.D.S., 514 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1973); Keniston v. Rowe, 16 Me. 38 (1839); Hall v.
Centolanza, 101 A.2d 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953); Glascock v. Anderson, 497
P.2d 727 (N.M. 1972).
101Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Humph. 410 (Tenn. 1846).
102Comish v. Smith, 540 P.2d 274 (Idaho 1977); State v. Kipers, 201 P. 68 (Kan. 1921);
Dorsey v. English, 390 A.2d 1133 (Md. 1978). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-956 (Law.
Co-op. 1985) ("The following evidence is admissible at a hearing to determine paternity:
•.. the court may view a child for the purpose of examining the presence or absence of
physical characteristics and similarities between the child and putative father ... ").
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specialist. 103 This could be particularly persuasive if the case is tried before a
jury and not a judge because of the "expert nature" of the testimony.104
Overall, bald eagle evidence has always been, and will continue to be,
extremely dubious and dangerous evidence. The question is not whether the
evidence is competent or even to what degree of competence it achieves. The
issue is whether it is even necessary to decide the above question of
admissibility at all. Likeness or unlikeness of resemblance between a child and
father is a function of heredity, and there is no formula or scientific principle
that states that a child must or must not look like its biological father. Although
the likelihood of physical similarities exist, it is also possible that they may not.
Therefore, this kind of evidence often appeals not to the sensibilities of the trier
of fact, but to the emotions. Bald eagle evidence is a trial device used to get the
child into the courtroom so as to present or create a pathetic and sympathetic
situation.105 This potential for abuse certainly outweighs any probative
value.106 Moreover, and most important, the issue of admissibility and weight
is no longer valid because genetic marker testing achieves what bald eagle
evidence had always sought to accomplish; that is, proof of genetic
transference. Thus, the use of bald eagle evidence should be prohibited. It
belongs upon the museum shelf of trial nonsense, right next to the spectral
evidence once used at the Salem witchcraft trials. 10 7
III. BLOOD GRouP TESTING
A. Concept
As a forensic tool, blood group testing has existed for most of the twentieth
century.108 Unlike the European courts, however, American courts were slow
1O3 See, e.g., In re R.D.S., 514 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1973); Almeida v. Correa, 465 P.2d 564
(Haw. 1970); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 450 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. 1983); see also Unif.
Parentage Act § 12(4), 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
104 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704 ('Testimony in the form of an expert opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.").
105Indeed, it is not inconceivable that a woman or an individual in a governmental
agency, with either malice or some other motive not related to the determination of
paternity, couldand would target a particular man based upon his physical resemblance
to the child. The action would then become the unpredictable swearing contest if not
for exclusion by blood or DNA testing.
106 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury .... ).
10 7 DAVID THOMAS KONiG, LAW & SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSErTS: ESSEX COUNTY,
1629-1692 171-72 (1979) (Witch trial procedures permitting admission of evidence
obtained from "spectral sources," such as apparitions seen by the accusers, "has been
cited as the most irrational, uncontrollable, and barbaric aspect of the entire witchcraft
episode.").
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to accept the evidentiary value of these tests and at first excluded them
entirely.109 Eventually, the tests were admitted on a limited basis, but it was not
until the 1940s that blood group testing was accepted as accurate and
evidentially competent 1 0
The scientific principle behind the blood group test is simple: blood can be
distinguished because it contains different antigens.111 These antigens may be
detected by performing a series of chemical tests. 112 Once these antigens are
detected, the blood may be classified into different groups. For example, in the
commonly known ABO blood grouping system, blood containing antigen A is
Group A, blood containing antigen B is Group B, blood containing both
antigens is Group AB, and blood which does not contain any antigens is Group
0.
In a criminal investigation, blood found at the scene of a crime may be tested
and compared to the victim's blood group and to a suspect's blood group.113
A match between the crime scene blood group(s) and the suspect's blood group
means that it is possible the blood found at the crime scene belongs to the
suspect. This possibility becomes greater if the victim's blood group and the
suspect's blood group are different because the blood could not belong to the
victim. Thus, this test becomes more meaningful when the victim's blood
group does not match the crime scene blood group(s). However, if the suspect's
blood group or the victim's blood group does not match the crime scene blood
group(s), by the concept of exclusion and based upon the blood evidence, it is
unlikely that the suspect was at the crime scene unless it is thought that the
crime was committed by more than one individual.11 4
108The first blood test was performed in 1900 by Dr. Karl Landsteiner in Vienna,
Austria. See generally John P. Ludington, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of
Blood-Group Tests in Disputed Paternity Cases, 43 A.L.R.4th 597 (1985); R.D. Hursh,
Annotation, Blood Grouping Tests, 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956); E.H. Turri, Annotation,
Blood-Grouping Tests, 163 A.L.R. 939 (1946).
109See, e.g., Commonwealth v. English, 186 A. 298 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936).
110See Williams v. State, 197 So. 562 (Fla. 1940); Shanks v. State, 45 A.2d 85 (Md. 1945);
Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209 (Me. 1948); Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct.
1942); State v. Clark, 58 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 1944); State v. Wright, 17 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio
1938); State v. Damm, 266 N.W. 667 (S.D. 1936); Euclid v. State, 286 N.W. 3 (Wis. 1939).
llSpecifically, an antigen is a foreign substance in the blood which is usually a
protein, at least in part, and may be some plant or animal protein, a bacterial toxin, the
protein of a virus coat, or may be derived from pollen. GEORGE W. BURNS & PAUL J.
BOTTINO, THE SCIENCEOF GENErics 346 (6th ed. 1989).
112The testing method is quite simple. Blood can be separated into red blood cells and
serum. If serum of a known grouping is mixed with unknown red blood cells,
agglutination (clumping) may occur. Whether or not agglutination occurs indicates the
presence or absence of antigens in the red blood cells. SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 5.02.
113MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 205.
1141n this example, it must be assumed that the crime scene blood could only belong
to either the victim or the suspect and not to some other third party.
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This concept of exclusion is likewise applicable to determinations of
paternity. The blood test, however, achieves a much greater significance
because here the determination does not prove the mere presence of the party
but goes to the very essence of the action. The science of genetics states that a
child's blood group is a hereditary trait acquired from either or both parents.115
Thus, a Group 0 mother and a Group 0 father can only produce a Group 0
child because neither the A nor B antigen is present in either parent. Moreover,
a Group A mother and a Group 0 father could only produce either a Group 0
or a Group A child, because all other groups would require the presence of the
B antigen in one of the parents.1 6 If a Group B child were born to a Group A
mother, it would be impossible for a Group 0 man to be the father because he
would be lacking the B antigen, and such a paternity action should be
dismissed by the court.
Dismissal, however, did not happen in the notorious 1945 Hollywood case
of Berry v. Chaplin,1 7 where Charles Spencer Chaplin, better known to the
world as Charlie Chaplin, was found by the jury to be the father of Carol Ann
Berry. Although blood grouping tests had been introduced to American courts
in the 1930s and were used in some jurisdictions as exclusionary evidence of
patemity,118 in 1937 the California Supreme Court held in Arias v. Kalensnikoff
ll 5 Even before the discovery of DNA, or of the gene, or of the intricate nature of the
chromosome, the twentieth century had accepted the principles of Mendelian
inheritance based upon the famous pea experiments performed by the Austrian monk
in the 1850s. For a general discussion of Gregor Mendel and the Mendelian gene see
GEORGE J. BREWER & CHARLES F. SING, GENETIcs 294-341 (1983); MARJORIE W.
FARNSWORTH, GENETIcS 1-55 (2d ed. 1988); BURNs & BOTTINO, supra note 111, at 1-70.
116 Below are the total combination possibilities of the ABO system:
OFFSPRING'S BLOOD GROUPPARENTS ' BLOOD
GROUP May Be Cannot Be
AB + AB AB, A or B 0
AB + A AB, A or B 0
AB + B AB, A or B 0
AB + O A or B A or O
A + A A or 0 AB or B
A + B AB, A, B or 0 No Group Impossible
A + 0 A or 0 AB or B
B + B B or 0 AB or A
B +O B or 0 AB or A
0 + 0 0 AB, A or B
11 7 There is no available cite for this case at the trial level. See Berry v. Chaplin, 169
P.2d 442 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946). See also SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 9.19.
1 18 5ee supra note 110.
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that exclusion by blood group testing was not decisive of the issue of paternity
and had to be weighed together with all other evidence which constituted
"ample evidence to support the finding of parentage."'' 9 This meant that a jury
could find Charlie Chaplin, Group 0, to be the father of a Group B child, Carol
Ann Berry, whose mother, Joan Berry, was Group A.120 The verdict was against
the comedian even though there was evidence indicating that the mother had
relations with several other men. 12 1 After the trial, juror's comments included
that "Mr. C was so nervous on the witness stand [that he] overacted his part"
and that Charlie Chaplin "had no evidence to prove that he was not the
father."122 One juror stated that "the evidence showed that he not only had the
opportunity [to be the father] but took advantage of it."123
On appeal, the California District Court of Appeal affirmed, citing Arias as
controlling.124 While the court conceded the "immutability of the scientific law
of blood-grouping," it went on to state that the "infallibility of the results of
blood tests depends on the skill employed in making them."125 Thus, the court
reasoned that blood test evidence was to be treated like any other evidence
which conflicts with other testimony and should therefore be weighed by the
trier of fact. According to the appeal court, the jury had properly weighed the
evidence and had permissibly disregarded the test. 126
119Arias v. Kalensnikoff, 74 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Cal. 1937).
120Berry, 169 P.2d at 445, 451-53.
12 1Id. at 449-50; See also SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 9.19.
122Chaplin Declared Father of Child, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,1945, at 25. This was the second
trial of the same paternity determination. The first trial ended in a mistrial because the
7 to 5 split decision in Chaplin's favor was 2 short of the required 9 votes to decide a
civil case. Id. The second trial was against the comedian 11 to 1. A burst of applause and
cheers came from some 30 spectators after the verdict was read. The lone dissenting
juror, a 65-year old housewife named Mrs. Mary H. James, stated that she was "not
upholding Mr. Chaplin at all-I want that understood, only I don't think he was the
father of the child." Id.
1231d. The jury verdict in the Chaplin case caused a nationwide stir and generated a
vociferous public outcry. For example, an editorial in the Boston Herald declared that
"[u]nless the verdict is upset, California has in effect decided that black is white, two
and two are five, and up is down." BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 19, 1945, at 24. Just the year
before, Chaplin had been acquitted of charges bya federal court jury that he had violated
the Mann Act; it had been alleged that he had transported Ms. Berry, his purported
acting student, across state lines for immoral purposes. Ms. Berry has previously been
convicted of vagrancy. See United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Cal. 1944);
United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
124Berry, 169 P.2d at 451.
1251d. Thus, the court allowed scientific fact to be disregarded by the jury.
126The jury also disregarded evidence which showed Joan Berry to be involved with
three other men and that they all had access during the time of conception. Berry, 169
P.2d at 449-50. One of these men, Paul Getty, ostensibly 'loaned" her significant sums
of money through his attorney. SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 9.19.
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We present this case in detail to illustrate how grave miscarriages of justice
may happen if scientific evidence is merely weighed by the jury. While there
can be no disagreement that a collateral attack upon the manner, method and
procedure used to render the test would always be proper,127 the position of
the California Supreme Court in the 1930s and 1940s was that the results of a
blood group test should be regarded merely as expert opinion.128 This
viewpoint was, of course, completely misplaced because reputable and
qualified serologists would not differ on the result of a blood grouping test.129
Therefore, to allow a trier of fact the discretion of rejecting scientific fact is
ludicrous. In Berry v. Chaplin, the emotions inherent in a paternity suit, fostered
by the reputation of the defendant, influenced by the bald eagle evidence, and
buttressed by the defendant's sexual access and inclinations overcame the
sensibilities of scientific principles. Had Charlie Chaplin not been excluded,
then it was up to the jury to decide his liability to Joan and Carol Ann Berry.
But once he was excluded, the inquiry at that point should have stopped.
12 7 See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989) for what some consider to be
a modern variation of Berry v. Chaplin regarding scientific evidence and its admissibility
and weight. Castro used a three-prong analysis to determine if DNA profiling was
admissible: (1) whether there was a theory generally accepted in the scientific
community which supports the conclusion that DNA profiling can produce reliable
results; (2) whether there were techniques or experiments that currently exist capable
of producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally accepted in
the scientific community; and (3) whether the testing laboratory performed the accepted
scientific techniques in analyzing the forensic samples of this particular case. Id. at 987.
It was the failure of the third prong that made the DNA evidence inadmissible as a
matter of law in Castro. Id. at 999.
12 8 The tension between blood tests being irrefutably conclusive or simply being
regarded as a matter of an expert's opinion was somewhat mitigated several years later
by a middle-tier position presented in Ross v. Marx, 93 A.2d 597 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1952). The court followed and cited a statement by the American Medical
Association regarding the legal conclusiveness of blood tests:
While the results of the blood tests are admissible when they exclude
paternity, the findings are not binding on the court. That is as it should
be. It is the duty of the court to examine the evidence in order to convince
itself that the tests have been properly carried out by qualified experts.
When the court feels that adequate safeguards have not surrounded the
tests, it should order the tests to be repeated by an independent expert, and
there is nothing to prevent shipping of the blood to another part of the
country if there is no qualified expert in the state in which the case is being
tried.... To base decisions entirely on the results of a blood test in such cases
may harm an innocent third party by bastardizing the child.
Id. at 599 (quoting Medicolegal Application of Blood Group Testing, 149 JAMA 699, 703
(1952)). It appears that while the tests were not to be considered conclusive, it was the
court's duty to make sure that the tests were properly performed. An improperly
performed test was not so much simply deemed inadmissible or given little weight, it
caused the court to order another test. Thus, the tests were repeated until the results
became-for all practical purposes-conclusive.
1 2 9 SCHATKN, supra note 13, § 9.19.
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
Since the discovery of the ABO blood grouping test in 1900, a multitude of
different blood grouping tests have been discovered and forensically applied:
significantly, MNSs (1927), P (1927), Rh (1939), Kell (1946), Duffy (1950), Kidd
(1951), HLA (1958), and a wide range of enzymes and serum proteins.130 Of
most significance is the Human Leukocyte Antigen ("HLA") test.131 Unlike all
other blood group tests which test for antigens found in the red blood cells,
HLA testing focuses on the white blood cell. While the different red blood cell
tests can identify a small number of antigens, HLA testing can identify
twenty-one genetic markers.132 This makes the HLA test far superior when
compared to all the other blood grouping tests.133
These tests are now collectively known as genetic marking tests.134 With
such a wide array of genetic markers, it is now possible to ascertain a
scientifically reliable probability figure in determining paternity. The question
then becomes how the probability "fact" is applied to a paternity determination.
B. The Mathematics Of The Probability Of Paternity
Paternity as evidenced by a genetic marking test may be expressed by either
an exclusion or inclusion probability. Each may be expressed as a percentage,
a ratio or merely as the odds that the putative father is or is not the biological
father. Nevertheless, no matter how the probability is expressed, it is essential
that the legislators, the judges and the lawyers all understand what the terms
and the numbers mean. 135
1301d. § 8.08. See also LEON M. SUSSMAN, BLOOD GROUPING TESTS (1st ed. 1968); ROBERT
RUSSELL RACE & RUTH SANGER, BLOOD GROUPS IN MAN (6th ed. 1976).
131 See Linda L. Lemmon & Lyon K. Murphy, The Evidentiary Use of the HLA Blood Test
in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 235 (1985); Patricia Bendschuh Blumberg, Note, Human
LeukocyteAntigen Testing: Technology VersusPolicyin Case of DisputedParentage, 36 VAND.
L. REV. 1587 (1983); Francine Protogere, Use of Human Leukocyte Antigen Test Results to
Establish Paternity, 14 IND. L. REV. 831 (1981); Randolph N. Jonakait, Will Blood Tell?
Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J. 833 (1982). See generally Jean E. Mass,
Annotation,Admissibility, Weightand Sufficiency ofHuman Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) Tissue
Typing Tests in Paternity Cases, 37 A.L.R.4th 167 (1985).
132 ABO (4 antigens); MNSs (3 antigens); Rh (7 antigens); Kell (2 antigens); Duffy (2
antigens); Kidd (2 antigens); and P (1 antigen). SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 8.04.
1331d. § 8.08.
134 For an informative look at the standards of blood group testing in disputed
parentage cases see Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in
Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976).
135 This Article cannot fully develop the various statistical and probability theories
inherent in this issue. For a full and complete understanding, see LAURENCE TRIBE, TRIAL
BY NUMBERS; D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Cases of Paternity
Testing, 75 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1989); Ira Mark Ellman & David Kaye, Probability and Proof,
Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (1979); Robert
W. Peterson, A Few Things You Should Know About Paternity Testing But Were Afraid to
Ask, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 667 (1982); R.C. Elston, Probabilities and Paternity Testing,
39 Am. J. HuM. GENETICS 112 (1986). See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.
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The Probability of Exclusion ("POX") has two distinct meanings. 136 First, it
refers to the ability that a single test can exclude a random man.137 For example,
if only the ABO test existed, and Group 0 blood occurred in sixty percent of
the same-race 138 male population, the probability of excluding a randomly
picked man testing only for Group 0 is two to five or forty percent since the
blood of forty percent of the population would contain either the A and/or B
antigens and would test negative for Group 0. Actually, under the complete
ABO blood grouping system, the true chance of exclusion, and thus
exonerating a falsely accused man, is approximately twenty percent.139 Thus,
theoretically, if a hundred random men were accused of fathering a specific
child, the POX resulting from an ABO blood test should conclusively eliminate
twenty men.
POX also refers to the percentage of falsely accused men who would be
excluded by the battery of test runs performed by a specific laboratory.14 0 It is
the measure of the ability of a laboratory to detect non-fathers based on the
genetic systems the laboratory studies.141 In other words, this figure denotes
what percentage of the population can be excluded using all the tests available
to the laboratory. If we begin with the ABO system exclusion figure of twenty
percent, and we introduce another genetic marking test, such as the MNSs test
which has a 31.6% exclusion, the overall exclusion rate would be increased to
45.3%.142 Today, with HLA testing (but excluding DNA testing) the overall
exclusion rate is 99.85%.143 This means that 99.85% of all falsely accused men
1989); Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992). We do advocate a uniformity in the
applied theory.
136See State ex rel. Hausner v. Blackman, 648 P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); E.G.
Reisner & T.A. Bolk, A Layman's Guide to the Use of Blood Group Analysis in Paternity
Testing, 20 J. FAM. L. 657 (1982). See generally McCoRMIcK, supra note 8, § 211.
137Since a putative father must be of the male gender, the term "random man"--not
"random person"-is used.
138 Most probability of paternity calculations are premised on the fact that the race of
the putative father is either known or can be pre-determined.
13 9 SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 8.04.
140Paternity Testing, Biomedical Reference Laboratories, Inc. (technical bulletin 1982).
See also MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 211 n.4.
141 See, e.g., Sutton v. Eddy, 828 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (paternity blood
test result "reflected a 95.26% power of exclusion and a 99.44% probability of [putative
father's] paternity....").
142The formula for calculating the probability of exclusion is:
P = 1- (1 - P1) (1 -P2) (1 - P3) ...
where P is the composite probability of exclusion, P1 is the probability of exclusion in
one system, P2 is the probability of exclusion in the second system, P3 is the probability
of exclusion in the third system, etc. Thus 1 - (1 - .2) (1 - .316) = 1 - (.8) (.684) = 1 - .547 =
.453. LEON N. SOssMAN, PATERNITY TESTING BY BLOOD GROUPING 8-9 (2d ed. 1976).
1 4 3 SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 8.08.
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will be excluded and therefore exonerated by these battery of tests. Thus,
theoretically, if a hundred random men were accused of fathering a specific
child, the POX resulting from a laboratory's prowess to conduct conclusive
paternity tests would conclusively eliminate ninety-nine men.
Whether the term "POX" is used to refer to the ability of a single test to
exclude or the ability of a laboratory to exclude, the legal result of an exclusion
is nonetheless the same: that it is scientifically impossible for a putative father
who is excluded by any one test to be the biological father. Thus, there is a third
meaning to POX when applied to a putative father who has been excluded by
any one test; in such a case thatperson's POX is 100 percent. Although all courts
now accept a 100 percent POX as conclusory, there is some misunderstanding
as to the application of the term. Some courts have misunderstood that, for
example, while the ABO test can only exclude twenty percent of randomly
selected men, once a man is excluded the POX-for that particular
suspect-become 100 percent.144
If the POX does not exclude the putative father, then the Probability of
Paternity ("POP") that the putative father is the biological father is calculated.
The POP is an estimate of the likelihood that the putative father is the biological
father of the child.14 5 It is determined by calculating the chance that the
putative father could produce a single sperm containing all the genetic
information a given child must have received from its biological father, as
compared to the chance that a random unrelated man of the same-race could
provide the necessary genetic information. Most often the POP is expressed as
an odds ratio called the Paternity Index ("PI") which is then translated to a
percentage. This odds ratio operates under the principle of Bayes' formula
whereby any putative father begins with the neutral odds of one to two or fifty
percent.146 In other words, it is exactly even that the defendant is or is not the
father. Genetic testing will then either lower the odds to zero by exclusion or
increase the odds above fifty. For example, if the gene frequencies of the
defendant is fifty times more likely to produce the actual child than the random
14 4See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 211 n.4.
14 5Here again, the terminology has become muddled and the courts have mixed up
or misapplied the terms "probabilities," "possibilities," "plausibility," and "likelihood."
See, e.g., County of Ventura v. Marcus, 189 Cal. Rptr. 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Carlyon v.
Weeks, 387 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel. Buechler v. Vinsand, 318
N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 1982); Tice v. Richardson, 644 P.2d 490 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Williams
v. Olden, 561 So. 2d 871 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Kammer v. Young, 535 A.2d 936 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1988); Frederick v. Burke, 397 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel.
Division of Family Servs. v. Guffey, 795 S.W.2d 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State ex rel.
Williams v. Williams, 609 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
146 The high court of one state will not permit trial courts to automatically accept
Bayes' Theorem in a criminal action. Sate v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247 (N.J. 1993). For a
discussion of Bayes' Theorem see Peterson,supra note 131, at 681-83; McCoRMIcK, supra
note 8, § 211 n.16. See also Randolph N. Jonakait, Whwn Blood is Their Argument:
Probabilities in Criminal Cases, Genetic Markers, and, Once Again, Bayes' Theorem, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 369 (1983).
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man of the same-race, then the PI is fifty to one, or ninety-eight percent. Simply
put, this indicates that the chance of finding a random unrelated man of the
same-race as the alleged father also capable of contributing a sperm with the
required genes is one in every fifty or fifty-one individuals.147 Since the PI
calculation is based upon the frequencies of the relevant genes in the random
population, it becomes significantly useful only when an appropriate number
of genetic systems are selected for and tested.
The POX and POP expressions are very misleading to the trier of fact.148 The
POX and POP probability concepts are independent concepts and are
mathematically unrelated.149 A testing laboratory's methodology is to run a
battery of tests in order to exclude the alleged father. If exclusion occurs based
on the absence of necessary genetic information, then the testing ceases and the
POX is 100 percent. If exclusion does not occur, then more tests are introduced.
Eventually, if exclusion still does not occur, the POP is calculated based on the
frequency which the specific gene or genes occurs in the general population.
However, this calculation may sound weightier than it is. For example, a PI of
five thousand to one would translate to a probability of paternity of 99.98%.150
14 7 This is one of the problems that the statisticians and probability mathematicians
need to iron out for the legislators and the courts. Does 50:1 mean I out of a group of 50
or 1 out of a group of 51. If it means I out of 50, then 98% (49/50) would be the proper
percentage, but if it means 1 out of 51 then 98.0392% (50/51) would be the correct
percentage. See Kaye, supra note 135, at 87-108.
148See Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 490 N.E.2d 788 (Mass. 1986).
14 9 Paternity Testing, supra note 140.
150The following table shows the PI to percentage relationships using both percentage
formula tions:





1000:1 J 99.9000000% 99.9000999%
200;1 J 99.950(0000 99.9500250%
500 I 99.90000M 99.9800040%
10,000-1 J 99.99000001_ 99.99000 10%
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Yet courts are reluctant to find paternity based on such figures because in a city
with a same-race male population of 500,000, or even 500,001, one hundred
other men might theoretically be the father.151 Taking this to a global scale, if
there are 500 million men of the same-race on the planet, 100,000 men might
theoretically qualify as putative fathers. Of course, out of these 100,000 possible
fathers scattered over the face of the planet, the likelihood that the true father
will be named the respondent in a paternity action is astronomically high.
However, the fact remains that paternity indexes are not mathematically solid
enough for many courts, primarily based on due process concerns, to accord
conclusive weight of paternity.152
Therefore, it is necessary to establish a uniformity when interpreting the POP
so that courts may understand the value of the statistic and accord it the proper
weight. Currently, for purposes of inclusion, while it appears that no court
would hold a genetic marker test used to prove the possibility of paternity as
completely inadmissible,153 many courts merely allow it into evidence and let
15 1Recently, a New York court was sharply divided on the weight to assign a DNA
paternity test. Debra L. v. William J., 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2271 (App. Div. 1993).
The majority stated that "[alccording to the expert testimony given at the hearing, the
combined indices [HLA and DNA] resulted in a value of 2,984,773 to 1, or 99.99+%, in
favor of the respondent's paternity, the sort of figures one court has called 'staggering'
[citations omitted]." Id. Based on the combination of the HLA and DNA test, the court
concluded that the "petitioner had met its burden of proving respondent's paternity by
'clear and convincing proof' [citation omitted]." Id. The minority, on the other hand,
stated that
[wihile it is true that the results of the HLA test are highly probative, they
are not conclusive [citations omitted]. The results of the additional DNA
test which was taken do not render the combination of tests conclusive, as
conceded by the majority. Such test results are only one item of evidence
among many which the trier of facts has at its disposal to aid in the deter-
mination, and the results need only be given such weight as the trier of facts
deems appropriate [citations omitted].
Id. Two New York Family Court judges have rejected a conclusive presumption of
paternity although one would permit a rebuttable presumption of paternity.
"If the paternity index indicates that there is any chance that the respondent is not
the father, then we would try the case to decide the issue in order to guarantee the
respondent's right to due process." Interview with Hon. George D. Marlow, former
Family Court (now Dutchess County Court) Judge, Dutchess County, New York, in
Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (June 24, 1991).
I believe a trial is required whenever a respondent contests paternity.
I do not believe that odds of I out of 10,000 are acceptable for a rebut-
table presumption of paternity; however, if the odds were 100,000 to 1, or
better, I would be comfortable with a rebuttable presumption of paternity.
Interview with Hon. Damian Amodeo, Family Court Judge, Dutchess County, New
York, in Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (uly 24, 1991).
152 See supra note 151.
15 3 State ex rel. Hausner v. Blackman, 662 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1983); Pizana v. Jones, 339
N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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the trier of fact weigh its probative value.154 Other states have instituted
statutes to create rebuttable presumptions even if the PI is as low as 20 to 1.155
Yet overall, courts are hesitant to make such conclusive findings based on
evidence of inclusion.156 Only by creating a uniformity of interpretation will
the POP be just and fair to all putative fathers. Moreover, now with DNA
profiling, the POP has become so precise that its meaning should be
acknowledged by all courts. Thus, it is now necessary to legislate the POP with
particularity into the paternity statutes so that the courts may properly and
legally apply this precision to future paternity actions.
IV. DNA TECHNOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
The discovery of the DNA molecule in 1953 by James Watson and Francis
Crick is probably one of the-if not the-greatest scientific achievements of the
twentieth century.157 This discovery has profoundly affected every branch of
the biological sciences and has opened the doors to biochemical and genetic
engineering. It should be noted that the use of DNA technology by forensic
science is a mere minor by-product of DNA research. Nevertheless, DNA
research has provided a means to distinguish all individuals, except identical
twins, by simply analyzing a tiny piece of biological material. 158
The paternity action for the next century should be based on this new
technology. When combined with other genetic marking tests, such as standard
blood grouping tests and HLA tests, the Probability of Paternity can be raised
to a Paternity Index of over a hundred million to one, or above 99.999999
percent.159 In order to appreciate the precision of DNA testing, it is important
154 Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. Price, 340 S.E.2d 408
(N.C. 1986); Smith v. Shaffer, 515 A.2d 527 (Pa. 1986).
. 155ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-342(h)(2)(B) (Michie 1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.12(1) (1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-234(3)(b) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03(A)(5)
(Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 504(C) (West 1991).
1561t should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has-at least indirectly
- acknowledged the validity of the POP in Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
15 7 See J AMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX: A PERSONAL ACCOUNTOF THE DISCOVERY
OF THE STRUCTURE OFDNA (1969). Both scientists won the Nobel prize in 1962 for their
discovery of the helical structure of DNA.
158While this is often referred to as a "DNA fingerprint," it is misleading to think that
DNA is "matched" in the same manner as two sets of fingerprints are matched. DNA
profiling is used to exclude suspects, first by one test, then by another, and if the suspect
is not excluded after a battery of these tests, then a probability of inclusion is calculated.
Although DNA profiling and classic fingerprint analysis are conceptually similar, the
similarities are-in the longrun-only slight. See Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
440, 441 n.2 (Mass. 1991).
159See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841,845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (expert testimony
that DNA test showed one in 800 million chance that defendant was not victim's rapist
or a probability of inclusion of 99.9999988%); King v. Tanner, 545 N.Y.S.2d 649,651 (Sup.
Ct. 1989) (HLA test showed probabilityofpatemity tobe 99.98% while DNA testshowed
probability of paternity to be 99.993%); In re Adoption of Baby Girl S, 532 N.Y.S.2d 634,
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to understand the basic knowledge of the technology.160 With such an
understanding, it is hoped that the reader will see why most future paternity
actions need never be tried.
A. Scientific Principles
Within the nucleus of all cells in the human body is a molecule called
DNA. 161 The DNA molecules make up the forty-six chromosomes located in
the nucleus of each nucleated cell of the human body, whether that cell is a skin
cell, a liver cell, a brain cell, or a white blood cell.162 The forty-six chromosomes
found within each cell of any one person are chemically identical to the other
forty-six chromosomes of any other cell within that same person. If the cells
are from different persons, there must be some difference in the chemical
composition of the chromosomes, unless the two people are identical
(monozygotic) twins.163
Chromosomes supply the "genetic information" of the body.164 In other
words, it is this difference in the chemical composition of the chromosomes
which make people different, with different physical and possibly
psychological traits. These different traits are encoded within the chromosomes
and are called genes. A gene is simply a segment of the chromosome. There are
like genes found in all human beings, but there are also variations of the same
635,637 (Surr. Ct. 1988) (HLA test showed paternity index to be 56,481 to 1 while DNA
test showed paterity index to be 8,077,911 to 1); People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643,652
(Albany County Ct. 1988), (expert testimony that mean power of identity for
identification test is 1.4 billion to 1 for African-Americans and 840 million to 1 for
American caucasians).
1601t would be helpful to read the following references and cases for a thorough
understanding of the precision and sophistication of DNA profiling: SCHATKIN, supra
note 13, §§ 11B.01-11B.05; DNA Analysis for Parentage Evaluation, Publication No.
T149-0391-1, TECHNOLOGY REvIEw, Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc. (1991); Peter E.
Smouse & Ranajit Chakrabouty, The Use of RFLP in Paternity Analysis, 38 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 918 (1985); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989); People v.
Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990);
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). For a discussion about the
precision of DNA probes to determine gene frequency, see Ivan Balazs, Michael Baird,
Mindy Clyne & Ellie Meade, Human Population Genetic Studies of Five Hypervariable DNA
Loci, 44 AM. J. HUM. GENETIcs 182 (1989).
161DNA is the abbreviation of the chemical deoxyribonucleic acid.
162 A red blood cell has no nucleus and thus no DNA. See People v. Wesley, 533
N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 n.4 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
163See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985,988 (Sup. Ct. 1989).




gene which are called "alleles."165 It is the detection of these alleles which DNA
profiling is all about.
All blood grouping tests, including HLA testing, are merely tests to
determine the absence or presence of specific genes, such as the A or B antigen.
The procedure is to subject the blood to a chemical test and then to observe
which result, of a series of known results, occurs. It is the presence or absence
of a particular gene found in the blood that produces this known chemical
result which is interpreted to either exclude or include the putative father
through the application of the laws of genetics. 166 Because a child receives
twenty-three chromosomes from its mother and twenty-three chromosomes
from its father--chromosomes which contain an abundant but finite number
of genes--a test which could identify a large number of these genes or which
could identify the many variations of the same gene would be very precise.
This is because a gene--any gene-found in the child and not found in the
mother must come from the father.167 Theoretically, because there is a finite
number of genes, if every gene could be detected, either a 100 percent POX or
a 100 percent POP result could be achieved.
To understand how the DNA profiling test identifies the different genes, the
chemical composition of DNA must be understood. The DNA molecule is often
described as a revolving double helix.168 For a working picture, one must
imagine either a spiraling ladder or a twisted zipper.169 Let us use the ladder
model. The sides of the ladder are composed of alternating units of sugar and
phosphate, and this composition is the same in every DNA molecule in every
human cell in every human being. The rungs of the ladder, however, are
composed of different chemical compounds than the sides. Moreover, there are
two chemically distinctive rungs. It is these different rungs of the ladder, and
in what order they are arranged, which create the specific genetic code, called
a genotype, of an individual.170
165Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 989. See also Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA
Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465,
470 (1990); Lander, supra note 164, at 501.
166See DNA Analysis for Parentage Evaluation, supra note 160. See also SCHATKIN, supra
note 13, § 11B.02.
167See Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 61-62; Dan L. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting:
Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Techniques, 28 JURIMETRICSJ. 455, 469-70 (1988).
168See Background Information: DNA-Print Identification Test, LifeCodes Corporation
(technical bulletin 1989); Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
1 6 9 See generally EDWARD FRANKEL, DNA: THE LADDER OF LIFE (1979).
170A genotype is the genetic characteristics of an individual while a phenotype is the
physical characteristics of the individual. See generally W.F. BODMER & L.L.
CAVALLI-SFORZA, GENETICS, EVOLUTION AND MAN (1976); CURT STERN, PRINCIPALS OF
HUMAN GENETICS (1978). When dealing with issues involving heredity, it is common to
speak of the haplotypes which is the genetic information inherited from a single parent.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 205.
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Each rung is composed of two nitrogenous bases. One of these bases is called
purine and the other is called pyrimidine. Half of the rung is a purine and the
other half is a pyrimidine. There are two types of purines which are called
adenine ("A") and guanine ("G"). There are also two types of pyrimidines called
thymine ("T) and cytosine ("C"). The purine and pyrimidine units chemically
bind to one another in the middle of the rung. A will bind only to T while G
will bind only to C. 171 Thus, part of the DNA molecule might be represented
as in Figure 1 below.
San. Lecods CpoItiow
Figure 1
It is the configuration of the various A-T, T-A, G-C and C-G
combinations-called base sequences-which create the genetic code. For a
simplistic example, the combination of the following rungs: A-T, C-G, G-C, T-A,
T-A, C-C might be the genetic code for blond hair, while C-G, G-C, T-A, A-T,
T-A, C-G might be the code for brown hair.172 Thus, all that is necessary is to
identify the various genes by their chemical combination and then compare
these combinations to child, mother and putative father. However, there is no
super microscope that reveals these chemical combinations as in Figure 1.
1 7 1Lawrence Silverman, DNA Analysis in the Detection of Genetic Disease, 4 NEw DEv.Sci. 69, 70 (1989); Victor Weedn, DNA Profiling, I EXPERT EVID. REP. 61, 62 (1989); C.
Lewis, DNA Fingerprints: Witness for the Prosecution, DISCOVER 44-47 (Jan. 1988).
1721n reality, these base pairs run into the thousands, ten thousands, or even hundred
thousands. If a single molecule of DNA could be unraveled, it would be approximately
six feet in length. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
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Therefore, a more ingenious, and certainly highly complicated, method was
developed.
B. Scientific Methodology
Although there are DNA molecules or parts of these molecules which are
identical in all human beings, thus forming genes which are universally found
in everybody, there are many areas of DNA located between those identified
and universal genes whose function is not yet known.173 However, these
variation of genes-or alleles-are important to forensic science not for what
they do in the biochemical operation of the body but for the chemical segments
they create and where they are located in the chromosome. These segments are
composed of small DNA sequences which are repeated a different number of
times in different individuals. As a result of the repetitions, these regions of
DNA significantly vary in size throughout the population. These variations in
DNA, known as polymorphisms,174 is what provides the identity profile. An
examination of the polymorphic loci of the chromosome will reveal different
alleles or nucleotide sequences. In other words, the location of the gene in the
chromosome and the determination of the chemical combination of the gene is
the operative science in DNA profiling.175
The forensic process of DNA profiling currently entails two distinct
methods: the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism test ("RFLP") and the
Polymerase Chain Reaction or amplification test ("PCR"). Both methods begin
with an extraction or isolation stage whereby biological material containing
DNAis extracted from the mother, child and putative father. In almost all cases,
this is simply a blood draw. Although red blood cells are not nucleated and
thus contain no DNA, whole blood also contains white blood cells which can
supply all the necessary DNA for analysis. Blood is also a familiar substance
and is quite easy to handle. After separating the white blood cells from the red
blood cells by centrifugal force, the white cells are purified and the DNA test
sample is prepared for the second step, depending on which method is to be
used. 1 7 6
1. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism
The first step of RFLP is called digestion. The purified DNA is exposed to
bacterial enzymes known as restriction endonucleases. These enzymes
1 73 These areas are also referred to as "anonymous sequences" or simply "junk DNA".
id.
17 4 Polymorphism ("many forms") is defined as "the quality or character of occurring
in several different forms... the occurrence together in the same population of two or
more genetically determined phenotypes in such proportions that the rarest of them
cannot be maintained merely by recurrent mutation." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1332 (27th ed. 1988).
175See generally Hoeffel, supra note 165.
176Thompson & Ford, supra note 4.
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molecularly cut the chromosomes at specific locations by recognizing distinct
chemical combinations of the nucleotides. The long DNA molecule is thus cut
into thousands of small fragments for size analysis. 17 7
The second step is to separate the fragments and to spread them out. This is
accomplished by the process known as electrophoresis.178 DNA molecules
have a net negative electrical charge because of the phosphate. By apply a
positive electrical charge, the DNA will be attracted to the electrode emitting
that positive charge. The DNA is put into one end of a semi-solid
medium-usually Agarose gel-and the positive charge is applied to the other
end. The DNA then moves through the medium, with the smaller and lighter
fragments moving faster and farther than the larger, heavier fragments. At the
end of the process, the DNA is spread throughout the medium in order of
decreasing size and molecular weight. Thus, the location of the DNA fragment
on the gel is a reliable indication of its size.1 79
The next step is to split the double stranded DNA fragments down the
middle of the ladder, thereby separating the A-T/C-G base pairs. This is done
by. introducing chemicals into the gel medium. This process is called
denaturing.
The next step is called Southern blotting.1 80 The single-stranded DNA
fragments are transferred from the electrophoretic gel to a permanent medium.
A sturdy nylon paper-or membrane-is placed over the gel and the DNA is
lifted by capillary action from the gel to the membrane and becomes trapped
in the nylon paper. After exposing the membrane to ultraviolet irradiation or
by baking the membrane, the DNA becomes permanently affixed to the
membrane. 18 1
The DNA is then ready for the process known as hybridization, whereby
DNA probes, manufactured in the laboratory and tagged with a radioactive
marker, are introduced to the sample DNA. This probe is a single stranded
fragment of DNA containing a specific defined base sequence. For example,
the probe might contain the sequence C-T-T-C-A-G. This probe would then
seek to hybridize or combine with a single stranded sample DNA fragment
with a base sequence of G-A-A-G-T-C. If such a fragment existed in the
membrane, hybridization would occur. There are two different types of probes.
One is a single locus probe ("SLP") which only seeks out a specific gene in a
177 See generally BENjAMIN LEWIN, GENES (3d ed. 1983).
178 See THOMAS MANIATIS, E.F. FRITSCH, J. SAMBROOK, MOLECULAR CLONINC: A
LABORATORY MANUAL (1982).
179 See Joseph G. Petrosinelli, Note & Comment, The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A
New Methodology, 79 GEO. L.J. 313,316 (1990).
180Southern blotting is named after its inventor, Dr. Edward H. Southern. See Edward
H. Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated by Gel
Electrophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975). See also Lawrence K. Altman, New
DNA Test Offers Biological "Fingerprints" for Crime Fight, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1986, at Al.
181 See Hoeffel, supra note 165, at 473; Burk, supra note 167, at 460.
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known location on the membrane. The other is a multi-loci probe ("MLP")
which detects genes from many locations on the membrane simultaneously. 82
Whichever probe is used, the hybridization process takes anywhere from six
to forty-eight hours to complete. After that, the membrane is "washed" and any
probes which did not hybridize with the sample DNA are removed. 183
The last laboratory step is called autoradiography. The test membrane now
contains sample DNA which has been cut and sorted. If hybridization has
occurred, which is very likely, the test sample also contains DNA which has
been radioactively tagged. A photographic film is placed over the membrane
and the radioactive emissions from the tagged DNA produce an x-ray picture
consisting of bands where the radioactive DNA is positioned on the membrane.
This picture is called an autoradiogram. 184 The bands resemble the bar codes
found on many consumer products.
Paternity Inclusion Paternity Exclusion
AJleged lle ed




Finally, the autoradiogram is interpreted. Each band designates a specific
gene of the individual. Similar location of bands would indicate similar genes.
When the three autoradiograms are compared, the child's bands and the
mother's bands are matched, leaving only the bands inherited by the child from
the biological father and the bands produced by the putative father's DNA.
These are called the obligatory bands. If interpretation yields a child's band not
182See Alec J. Jeffreys, Victoria Wilson & Swee Lay Thein, Individual-Specific
"Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76, 78 (1985).
183See SCHATKIN, supra note 13, § 11B.01.
184 An autoradiogram is also called an autoradiograph or simply an autorad. See L.
Bonner, Autoradiograms: 35S and 32P, 152 METHODS IN ENZYMOLOGY 55 (1987).
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found in the putative father's bands, then he is excluded. If not, a POP may be
calculated depending on the gene frequency of the specific probe. 185
2. Polymerase Chain Reaction
The other way of detecting fragment length polymorphism is not to
fragment the DNA sample but to amplify a specific gene.186 An enzyme called
DNA polymerase is used which causes a specific gene to copy itself. In effect,
the laboratory creates millions of copies of a specific gene. The advantages of
this method is that it can be performed in less than twenty-four hours, as
compared to RFLP which takes approximately two weeks to complete. 187
Moreover, visual interpretation of the results is quicker and simpler.188
Specifically, the DNA is placed in a heating device called a thermal cycler
which denatures the double-stranded DNA into single strands. The laboratory,
knowing which gene it wishes to copy, introduces two short pieces of
laboratory-manufactured DNA called primers.189 These hybridize with the
base sequences on either side of the base sequence to be copied. For example,
if an overall base sequence is T-A-T-C-G-C-C-G-T on one side and the
complementary base sequence on the other side was A-T-A-G-C-G-G-C-A, and
the base sequences to be copied are C-G-C and G-C-G, the primers would be
A-T-A and G-C-A on one side and T-A-T and C-G-T on the other side. This
creates the DNA template, as shown in Figure 3 below.
185Ronald J. Richards, Note, DNA Fingerprintingand Paternity Testing, 22 U. CAL. DAVIS
L. REV. 609,621-24 (1989).
186 PCR was developed by Cetus Corporation in 1984 and has since sold this
technology to Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. which now markets it as Amplified Fragment
Length Polymorphism ("AmpFLP"). See Barnaby J. Feder, Dispute Arises over Rights for
Copying DNA, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at D7. See also Letter, James M. Mason, Ph.D.,
Director, Dep't of Parentage Evaluation, Roche Biomedical Laboratories (a subsidiary
of Hoffman-LaRoche Inc.). This technique is also known as "allele-specific probe
analysis" which "relies on technology [that] is newer and perhaps less widely accepted
than the other tests." Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 49-50.
187 DNA Analysis for Parentage Evaluation, supra note 160.
188Id. See Kary B. Mullis, The Unusual Origin of the Polymerase Chain Reaction, SCI. AM.,
Apr. 1990, at 56. See also Spenser v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va. 1990); Russel
Higuchi, Cecilia H. Von Beroldingen, George F. Sensabaugh & Henry A. Erlich, DNA
Typing from Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543 (1988).
189See J. Madeleine Nash, Ultimate Gene Machine, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 54-56.
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Figure 3
The polymerase then causes an exact copy of the DNAtemplate to be created.
These three steps of denaturing, primer binding and DNA synthesis is called
one PCR cycle and the new DNA is called the PCR product.190
This PCR process is then repeated, and each cycle doubles the amount of
specific DNA from the previous cycle, until millions of copies are produced.
Then the amplified DNA is put through electrophoresis as with RFLP, but the
DNA is chemically stained and not radioactively tagged. The staining
technique achieves detection very quickly as opposed to radioactive probes
which are time consuming. 191
The interpretation of a PCR test result is likewise quicker because the sizing
requirement of RFLP is eliminated. The result is a yes-no answer as to whether
a specific gene is present. As with any genetic marking test, if the specific gene
190DNA Analysis for Parentage Evaluation, supra note 160.
191Dale Dykes, The Use of Biotinylated DNA Probes in Parentage Testing: Nonisotopic
Labelling and Nontoxic Extraction, 9 ELECTROPHORESIS 359 (1988); Dale Dykes, P. Fondell,
E. Watkins & H.F. Polesky, The Use of Biotinylated DNA Probes for Detecting Single Copy
Human Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Separated by Electrophoresis, 7
ELECTROPHORESIS 278 (1986).
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is present in the child but absent in both the mother and the putative father, the
putative father is excluded. If the gene is present in the putative father, a gene
frequency is calculated to determine the POP. Another PCR test may have to
be conducted using a different genetic marker, and if this specific gene is
present, a higher POP will be calculated based on the frequency of the two
specific genes tested. Obviously, the test may be repeated as many times as
necessary to achieve a near 100 percent POP.192
C. Evidentiary Admissibility
The evidentiary admissibility of DNA profiling is becoming universal.
Whether the evidence is used in a criminal or a civil proceeding, most
jurisdictions adhering to the Frye193 standard have held that DNA profiling has
been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The minority of
jurisdictions which have either never adhered to or have simply abandoned
Frye impose a basic--and more liberal-relevancy test as exemplified by Rule
401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 194 Thus, in almost all jurisdictions and in
most cases, DNA profiling has been granted judicial approval.195
192Stephen C. Petrovich, Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment, 24 GA. L. REV. 669,
673-81 (Spring 1990); Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 76-77.
193Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The standard is embodied in the
following statement by the court:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recogni-
zed, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014. The status of Frye has been significantly modified. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 4805 (No. 92-102, June 28, 1993).
194Fed. R. Evid. 401 states that "relevant evidence is any evidencehaving any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." See generally
Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: An Alternative to the Frye Rule,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984).
195See, e.g., United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Tipps v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Perry v. State, 586 So. 2d
242 (Ala. 1991); People v. Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345 (II1. App. Ct. 1991); Smith v.
Deppish, 807 P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); People v. Adams, 489 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. App. Ct.
1992); Mastromatteo v. Harkins, 615 A.2d 390 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); State v. Wimberly,
467N.W.2d 499 (S.D. 1991); Trimboli v. State,817S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Rivera
v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992). But see Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311
(Mass. 1992); State v. Houser, 409 N.W.2d 168 (Neb. 1992). See generally Clare M. Tande,
Note, DNA Typing: A New Investigative Tool, 1989 DUKE L.J. 474 (1989); Sally E. Renskers,
Comment, Trial by Certainty: Implications of Genetic "DNA Fingerprints", 39 EMORY L.J.
309 (1990); Petrosinelli, supra note 179; Petrovich, supra note 192; Jane E. Hanner, Note,
DNA Fingerprinting: Evidence of the Future, 79 KY. L.J. 415 (1991); Jeffrey A. Norman,
Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: Is It Ready for Trial?, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 (1990); C.
Thomas Blair, Comment, Spencer v. Commonwealth and Recent Developments in the
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Whether the specific testing procedures used in DNA profiling have met the
Frye standard so that the evidence obtained is reliable remains in issue. 196 As
with any scientific test, the evidence is only as good as the laboratory that
conducts the test and the experts that interpret the results. However, it is hardly
arguable that a state cannot ensure that a laboratory conducting these kinds of
tests comply with generally accepted scientific procedures.197 Moreover, the
laboratory would seem to have a vested interest in only using those procedures
which pass the Frye standard. Thus, this issue appears to be moot.
One major issue of DNA profiling that must be addressed is the collection
and isolation of the test sample before the laboratory assumes custody.198 Yet
within this issue, the criminal case must be distinguished from the paternity
action. In the criminal case, the biological material found at a crime scene or
obtained under less than ideal circumstances may often be tainted or
contaminated. Moreover, in many cases the quantity of biological material
available is so minute that it is difficult to collect and isolate, or to do so without
damaging the sample.199 There may be a higher incidence of mislabeling. There
Admissibility of DNA Fingerprint Evidence, 76 VA_ L. REV. 853 (1990); Paul C. Giannelli,
Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991).
196Again, the courts must be careful not to allow the Berry v. Chaplin mistake of letting
the trier of fact ignore evidence of scientific fact because of the testing procedure. This
has been indirectly enunciated with vigor by the decision in People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
197See Gary Spencer, Panel Urges DNA Test Standard, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1989, at A2.
Recently, the National Academy of Sciences has stirred the debate by releasing a report
entitled "DNA Technology in Forensic Science". Some have construed this report as
calling for a moratoriumon DNAprofiling. SeeGina Kola ta, U.S. Panel Seeking Restriction
on Use of DNA in Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1992, at Al, C7; Gina Kolata, Chief Says
Panel Backs Courts' Use ofa Genetic Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,1992, atAl, A23; Gina Kolata,
DNA Fingerprinting: Built-In Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,1992, at Al3; Gina Kolata, Sotne
Scientists Doubt the Value of Genetic Fingerprint Evidence, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29,1990, at Al,
A18; Debra Cassens Moss, DNA: The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A.J. 66 (1988). See also Joe
Davidson &Jonathan M. Moses, Use of DNA Evidence in Court Endorsed, WALL ST. J., Apr.
15,1992, at B6; Daniel Wise, Clamor over DNA Report Provides Gristfor Both Sides, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 17, 1992, at 1,11. New York Governor Mario Cuomo has proposed the creation of
a new "Forensic Science Review Panel" to develop minimum standards for all forensic
laboratories in the state. Governor Proposes DNA Database, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 2;
Selwyn Raab, Cuomo Seeks Genetic Data of Offenders, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1992, at A27,
A34.
198 See Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment, DNA Identification Tests and the
Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903 (1991); Thompson & Ford, supra note 4.
199 While it is undisputed that the PCR process-with its ability to "copy" DNA-has
reduced the problems associated with processing a miniscule sample, see supra notes
182-88, the problems of collecting such a sample still exist. Moreover, even with PCR,
the miniscule sample may be contaminated and the wrong DNA could be copied. See
Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 64; Hanner, supra note 195, at 422.
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is also the possibility of the biological material being mishandled, either by
accident or design.200
Of greatest concern is the rigid requirement of due process afforded to the
criminal defendant. Since the criminal defendant faces either death or
substantial imprisonment, the safeguards granted to such a defendant must be
greater than those granted to a putative father at a paternity proceeding.
Moreover, the probative value of the DNA evidence, particularly if it is state's
strongest or only evidence, might substantially be outweighed by its prejudicial
value. In a criminal action, this certainly becomes more of a burden since the
state must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a civil paternity action, however, the standard of proof is usually by clear
and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence, not evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the DNA evidence sustains the burden, the result
is not imprisonment but an order of filiation, imposing both rights and
responsibilities, burdens and benefits, not only on the putative father but on
the mother and child as well. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
collection stage does not present the uncertainties of biological evidence found
at a crime scene.20 1 In almost all cases, the simple blood draw, performed by
qualified personnel and under proper procedures, eliminates any questions of
collection aberrations. 202 Even in those cases where the putative father is not
available for testing, either because of death or disappearance, any biological
remains of that person, properly certified, may be used for testing purposes. 203
200This, of course, is one of the great fears involving DNA evidence: that someone
might be convicted of a crime because a biological sample was coincidentally left, or
maliciously placed, at the crime scene. The other great fear is that the collection of DNA
evidence will violate the constitutional right to privacy. This Article does not address
the extremely important issue of DNA data banking. For a thorough discussion see E.
Donald Shapiro, Dangers of DNA: It Ain't Just Fingerprints, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23,1990, at 1; E.
Donald Shapiro & Michelle Weinberg, DNA Data Banking: The Dangerous Erosion of
Privacy, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 455 (1991); Myk Cherskov, Fighting Genetic Discrimination,
78 A.B.A. J. 38 (1992).
201See Rorie Sherman, DNA Tests Unravel?, NAT. L. J., Dec. 18,1989, at 24; Burk, supra
note 167, at 456; Anthony Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal
Trials, 77 CAL. L. REV. 665,670-73 (1989).
202 See J.E.B. v. State ex. rel T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (forensic DNA
testing distinguished from clinical DNA testing); S.L.B. v. K.A., 579 N.Y.S.2d 964,966-68
(Fam. Ct. 1992) (People v. Castro distinguished based on differences in civil and criminal
DNA sample collection method).As an added testing control measure, the mother, child
and putative father might be assembled together and have the blood drawn in each
other's presence. Of course, as adverse parties involved in an emotionally charged issue,
this added measure of immediate propinquity may create more problems than it solves.
203 See, e.g., Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (Court permited
examination of corpse for DNA paternity test); Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310
(Ohio P. Ct. 1988) (court allows deceased putative father to be exhumed for purposes
of DNA paternity test). But see, Estate of Sidney Janus, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1993, at 24
(court denies exhumation of deceased putative father for purposes of paternity test
because, inter alia, "[t]here may not be sufficient DNA material....". For a discussion
of whether or not an action will be against a deceased putative father, see W.E. Shipley,
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In all, the differences between the use of DNA profiling in a paternity
proceeding and in a criminal trial are so great that a comparison between the
two is unreasonable. But of greatest significance is that in a criminal case the
DNA evidence merely goes to the proof of identification and to the fact of the
defendant's presence at the crime scene. It does not go to the proof of the
criminal act itself. In a paternity proceeding, however, the DNA evidence -
directly and ultimately-goes to the very issue being tried. Even in a rape trial,
DNA evidence proving the act of sexual intercourse by the defendant does not
prove the issue of rape because the question of consent remains open.204 It is
only in the paternity action that DNA evidence, having proved the identity of
the father, leaves no other issue of the action to be decided.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE PATERNITY ACTION
As this Article has shown, the paternity action has evolved from a criminal
action into a civil one. The punishments and penalties of fatherhood now
includes both rights and responsibilities. Accordingly, the standards and
burdens of proof under this action have likewise changed.
The "mechanics" of the proceeding have also changed. Once, the proceeding
had to contend with very little competent evidence consisting mostly of
uncorroborated testimony and/or pseudo-scientific bald eagle evidence. Now,
the action has transcended to a process which can completely determine
paternity by a precise scientific testing method. DNA profiling has given to the
judicial system not only the means to settle a legal issue with speed and efficacy,
but also through a process that decides the issue fully and fairly.
While the majority of today's paternity actions are not disputed, those that
do go to trial only burden the judicial process and take advantage of the law.
The fact remains that the law has not kept current, and these trials to determine
paternity are for the most part unnecessary. Tomorrow's paternity actions
should not be burdened by the ambiguity of statutes or the overloading of the
judicial machinery. Tomorrow's paternity actions should-and can-be swiftly
decided without a trier of fact. The use of DNA profiling in this
process-properly performed--can only be of benefit to all parties.
Moreover, in our highly mobile, computerized electro-magnetic world, it
certainly would be beneficial if society knew exactly who had produced whom.
Succession rights, citizenship rights and medical necessities are just some of
the reasons, other than support or tax obligations, that a state would want its
citizenry properly defined by their biological relations. Of course, although
these relationships may not be biologically broken, they may always be legally
altered through custody, guardianship or adoption proceedings after any
Annotation, Death of Putative Father as Precluding Action for Determination of Paternity or
for Child Support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188 (1992).
204 0f course, DNA evidence would conclusively prove statutory rape since it is a strict
liabilitycrime where the issueof consent is immaterial. However, whether a courtwould
apply a reasonable doubt standard to the DNA profiling test to prove the element of the
crime or some lower proof standard might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
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biological determinations have been adjudicated. If society is to thrive and
succeed in this information age, it is necessary that the information-including
first and foremost its biological information-be correct.
Furthermore, it should be recognized that under the doctrine of parens patriae
a state has the right to know who has fathered its children. Accordingly, a state
has standing to bring a paternity action in the interests of the people. Others
who have standing must include the mother. A biological father denied
visitation because he is not the father of record would also appear to have
standing. Moreover, the father of record who, for whatever reason, wants to
prove that he is not the biological father is another who most likely has
standing. Finally, there will be situations where other individuals, notably
grandparents, may want to claim standing to determine paternity and
establish their rights.
Finally, there is the question as to whether the child should have the right to
discover the identity of its true father, and if so, then what restrictions may a
state impose which would be constitutionally permissible. This Article is not
designed to address this specific question, but leaves such a debate open.
However, we take note of the growing movement by children's rights groups
who advocate that out-of-wedlock children be permitted this right.
This thus leaves us on the doorstep of tomorrow with a precise method to
determine paternity but a hodgepodge of statutes across the nation which are
antiquated, ambiguous or simply not comprehensive. This only summons
litigation concerning the issues of litigation, not the subject of the litigation
itself. It is our belief that the paternity action must be driven by genetic marking
tests under the watchful eye of the courts. These tests may either exclude or
include the putative father as the biological father, and should both be given
conclusive weight if certain requirements are met. It is only up to the state
legislatures to ensure that a modem paternity statute, which provides for
expedient determination of paternity and yet grants full substantive and
procedural due process rights passing constitutional muster under
intermediate judicial scrutiny is enacted immediately so that a needless waste
of resources is avoided. Below we offer model legislation which if enacted in
all jurisdictions, even with some variations, would create a uniformity that can
only better society.
VI. THE UNIFORM PATERNITY DETERMINATION ACT
1. NAME: This Act shall be known as the Uniform Paternity Determination
Act and should be cited by that name or by its abbreviation of UPDA.
2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this act is to establish the method and
procedure by which a court of competent subject matter jurisdiction shall
determine paternity when paternity is at issue.
3. CIVIL ACTION: A paternity action under this act is a civil action and not
a criminal action.
4. COURT OF COMPETENT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: All
paternity actions commenced in this state shall be heard in the [name of the court
of competent subject matter jurisdiction] which has exclusive original jurisdiction.
5. TRIER OF FACT: The trier of fact under this act shall be a judge of the




6. PARTIES: The parties to this action shall be known as petitioner and
respondent.
7. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION: The action is commenced by the
filing of a petition in the [court of competent subject matter jurisdiction] by a party
who has standing.
8. STANDING: The following have standing to file a petition:
(1)The specific child,
(2)The biological mother,
(3)The legal custodian or legal guardian of the child,
(4)The father of record,
(5)The putative biological father,
(6)The grandparents of record,
(7)The putative biological grandparents,
(8)Any authorized federal, state or local governmental agency,
department, division, commission, organization or group, and
(9)Any individual or organization which, in the court's
discretion, has shown good cause to have standing approved
by the court.
9. RESPONDENTS: The respondent may be any party who has standing
as a petitioner.
10. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS: A petition may be filed in the court
of competent subject matter jurisdiction in any state where any party [resides]
[has resided for at least !x) duration]. The filing of a petition by any party who has
standing naming a specific individual as the putative father of a specific child
precludes the filing of any other petition by any other party in any other
jurisdiction naming that specific individual as the putative father of that
specific child. A court of competent subject matter jurisdiction where a valid
petition has been filed has the discretion to transfer the action to another court
of competent jurisdiction in another state in the interests of fairness, justice and
reason.
11. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: This action must be commenced by any
party except the child or any authorized governmental body within [x] years
from the child's birth. The action must be commenced by the child within [x]
years from the time the child reaches majority. The action may be commenced
by any authorized governmental body at any time.
12. NO PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY: There is no presumption that
a child born to a legally married couple is an issue of that marriage.
12. [Alternate] PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY: The court shall presume
that a child born to a legally married couple is an issue of that marriage. The
presumption may be rebutted, if the action is brought within [x] years from the
birth of the child, by clear and convincing evidence that the father of record
was incapable of fathering the child.
13. BURDENS OF PROOF: The petitioner must prove by [clear and
convincing] [a preponderance of the] evidence that the putative father is the
biological father.
14. PETITION: The petition must (1) name the putative biological father
and the biological mother of the specific child in question, (2) request the court
to determine the validity of the assertion of paternity and to adjudicate
paternity and (3) request the court to order a certified paternity test of the child,
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the biological mother, the putative father and any other party or individual
relevant to the action. A petition must only name one specific child in question;
a petition which names more than one specific child in question shall be
dismissed by the court without prejudice.
15. SERVICE OF PETITION: The petition, along with a notice to appear,
must be personally served upon the respondent. It may be served within or
without the state where the petition is filed. It must be served by a person who
is eighteen years or older and who is not a party to the action. The person who
personally serves the petition and notice must file an affidavit of personal
service with the court. If the respondent cannot be found after a diligent search,
or if the respondent refuses service, by evasion or by similar conduct, then the
court may order service by any other means reasonably calculated to give the
respondent notice of the action.
16. ANSWER: The answer must (1) be served on the petitioner or filed with
the court within 20 days after the service of the petition and notice, (2) admit
or deny that the putative father named in the petition is the biological father
and (3) name the true biological father of the specific child if known to the
respondent if the respondent denies that the putative father named in the
petition is the biological father.
17. VERIFICATION: Both the petition and the answer shall be verified by
oath or affirmation under penalty of perjury.
18. DEFAULT: Default by the respondent shall result in the granting of the
petition. At the sole discretion of the court, a respondent with an excusable
default may file an answer at any time and the court may vacate the default
judgment.
19. CERTIFIED PATERNITY TESTS: The court shall order the child, the
biological mother, the putative father and all other parties relevant to the
determination of paternity to submit to a certified paternity test ("CPT"). A
party may not refuse to submit to a CPT based on religious or medical reasons.
The refusal by any party to submit to a CPT shall be considered by the court as
an act of civil contempt. If any party refuses to submit to a CPT, the court may
decide the issue of paternity against the party who is refusing to submit to the
CPT.
20. CERTIFIED PATERNITY TESTING LABORATORY: The CPT shall be
administered by a certified paternity testing laboratory ("CPTL). The
[authorized public officiall of the [authorized department] shall certify at least two
laboratories for paternity testing and prescribe regulations regarding the
collection of the test samples, the chain of custody of the test samples, the
testing methods used by the CPTL, the quality control of the testing procedures,
and the analysis of the test results.
21. CERTIFIED PATERNITYTEST SAMPLES: All parties to the action must
submit to a CPT as ordered by the court and allow the collection of certified
paternity test samples. Test samples may be blood samples, skin samples, hair
samples, tissue samples or may be any biological material that can be certified
as belonging to and being of the specific party to be tested. If a party is not
available for testing, due to death, disappearance or otherwise, then the court
may order the collection of a certified biological sample of that party from any
available source to be used as a test sample. A fetus or newborn must provide
test samples unless two physicians submit affidavits declaring that the
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collection of such test samples is medically dangerous to the mother, or to the
fetus or newborn.
22. CPTL PROCEDURE: The certified paternity test samples shall be
subjected to genetic marking tests which are generally accepted by the scientific
community. This includes, but is not limited to, blood grouping tests, human
leukocyte antigen ("HLA") tests and deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") profiling
tests. The number of tests and the type of tests shall be prescribed by regulation
or shall be conducted at the discretion of the CPTL.
23. CPT METHOD: The CPT shall attempt to exclude the putative father
under the principles of heredity by genetic marking tests which are generally
accepted by the scientific community. If the CPT results do not exclude the
putative father, then the CPTL shall calculate a Probability of Paternity ("POP')
under generally accepted scientific and statistical methods based upon
population gene frequency which is to be expressed as both a Paternity Index
("Pr') and as a percentage.
24. EXCLUSION: If the CPT excludes the putative father as a possible
biological father, then the court shall dismiss the petition with prejudice.
25. INCLUSION: POP BELOW [99] PERCENT: If the POP is below [99]
percent, then the court shall conclusively presume that the putative father is
not the biological father and the petition shall be dismissed with prejudice.
26. INCLUSION: POP BETWEEN [99-99.99] PERCENT: If the POP is at
least [99] percent but below [99.99] percent, then the court shall try the issue of
paternity and admit all relevant evidence.
27. INCLUSION: POP BETWEEN [99.99-99.9999] PERCENT: If the POP is
atleast [99.99] percent but below [99.9999] percent, then the court shall presume
that the putative father is the biological father. This presumption may be
rebutted by the respondent only by clear and convincing evidence that the
putative father was totally incapable of fathering the child, or that the putative
father has an identical twin [or that the mother has engaged in multiple sexual
relations during the time of conception].
28. INCLUSION: POP ABOVE [99.9999] PERCENT: If the POP is at least
[99.9999] percent or above, then the court shall conclusively presume that the
putative father is the biological father unless the respondent has declared in
his answer the fact that the putative father has an identical twin, and if so then
the court shall try the issue of paternity and admit all relevant evidence.
29. REBUTTAL: A respondent may rebut a presumption of paternity but
only by submitting a motion to rebut which must be supported by affidavits
showing evidence that the putative father could not be the biological father of
the child. The court, in its sole discretion based upon the strength of the rebuttal
evidence, shall then try the issue of paternity and admit all relevant evidence.
30. ADDITIONAL CPT REQUESTS: Any party may request, and the court
shall order if requested, a second CPT regardless of the test results. Any party
may request, and the court, in its sole discretion, may order, a third or
subsequent CPT.
31. COSTS OF CPT: The cost of the first CPT shall be paid by the petitioner
if the putative father is determined not to be the biological father or by the
respondent if the putative father is determined to be the biological father.
Subsequent CPTs shall be paid by the party requesting the CPT if the
subsequent CPT validates the first CPT. If the subsequent CPT invalidates the
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first CPT, then the petitioner shall pay the cost of all CPTs if the putative father
is determined not to be the biological father or by the respondent if the putative
father is determined to be the biological father. The state shall pay the cost of
the CPTs if the party who must pay is indigent.
32. OTHER COSTS: In addition to the cost of the CPT, the court may order
either party to pay all or part of any other reasonable costs, including attorneys'
fees.
33. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION/ IMPLANTATION: A man who
donates his sperm or a woman who donates her ovum for the purposes of
reproduction but who does not have, at the time of donation, the intent to be a
parent (putative or otherwise) shall have no right to bring this action and shall
have no liability under this act.
34. SEX REASSIGNMENT: The fact that the putative father has undergone
a sex reassignment is not a bar or a defense in this action.
35. SURROGACY: A woman who does not provide her own chromosomes
but who carries and gives birth to a child is not the biological mother of that
child under this act.
36. ALTERNATIVE PROCREATION: If the specific child is a result of
alternative or recombinant procreation methods achieved through genetic
engineering conducted in a laboratory or in a similar environment, or by any
other means or by any other method, then the court is free, in its sole and
unbridled discretion, to determine both maternity and paternity by any
method and procedure whatsoever.
37. INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION: This act shall have international
application either by treaty or under the doctrine of coniity. All determinations
of paternity under this act shall be recognized by all international forums and
jurisdictions.
38. SEPARABILITY AND SEVERABILITY: Any provision of this act found
to be unconstitutional or invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction may be
separated and severed from this act, and such finding shall not affect or impair
the constitutionality or validity of the remainder of this act or the application
thereof to other persons and circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION
From ancient times, the issues of paternity have always existed, creating both
legal and social tensions. Yet there was no paternity action until the English
Parliament created it in 1576. Since then, the paternity action has transformed
from a criminal action into a civil action. Accordingly, the standards and
burdens of proof, as have the trial techniques, have changed. It is
unquestionable that the state has a compelling interest in knowing who the
father of any given child is, particularly those children who have become public
charges. Moreover, the mother undoubtably has a right to know, as does the
biological father and the father of record. And the argument can be made that
the out-of-wedlock child also has a right to know. Thus, when the issue of
paternity arises, it should be settled and settled expeditiously.
Society now has the tools to determine paternity swiftly and accurately. With
the advent of DNA profiling, as well as other genetic marking tests, a proper
laboratory can not only determine paternity by excluding a falsely accused
man, but it can compute the probability that the genetic material found in the
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child came from that non-excluded accused man. With HLA and DNA testing,
the probability is so close to 100 percent that the paternity trial as we know it
today should be abolished. States should enact legislation whereby these
genetic tests are given conclusive weight of the presumption of paternity,
subject to the court's discretion in rare and extreme instances.
The model legislation appropriately called the Uniform Paternity
Determination Act offered in this Article resolves the troublesome issues of
jurisdiction, standing, presumptions and conclusions. If enacted in all fifty
jurisdictions it will save millions of dollars that would otherwise be spent
challenging these issues and those related simply to statutory construction.
With the number of illegitimate births increasing every year, coupled with the
ever increasing precision of DNA profiling, it is imperative that the UPDA or
a similar version be implemented at once.

